Re: Tsvart last call review of draft-ietf-ice-rfc5245bis-16

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Hi,

See inline for text proposal and clarification on that last editorial issue.


Den 2018-02-01 kl. 13:39, skrev Christer Holmberg:
Hi,

Significant Issues:

A. Section 5.2:

     Lite implementations only utilize host candidates.  A lite
     implementation MUST, for each component of each data stream,
allocate
     zero or one IPv4 candidates.  It MAY allocate zero or more IPv6
     candidates, but no more than one per each IPv6 address utilized by
     the host.  Since there can be no more than one IPv4 candidate per
     component of each data stream, if an ICE agent has multiple IPv4
     addresses, it MUST choose one for allocating the candidate.  If a
     host is dual-stack, it is RECOMMENDED that it allocate one IPv4
     candidate and one global IPv6 address.  With the lite
implementation,
     ICE cannot be used to dynamically choose amongst candidates.
     Therefore, including more than one candidate from a particular
scope
     is NOT RECOMMENDED, since only a connectivity check can truly
     determine whether to use one address or the other.

I find it quite strange that the above text says there can only be
single
IPv4
based candidate, while for IPv6 a LITE implementation may have one
candidate
per IPv6 address. Isn't the LITE implication of having multiple
candidates for
the same address family similar? Yes, IPv6 kind of forces the need for
dealing
with multiple IPv6 addresses on any host. However, I can see that
certain
servers will actually be multi-homed in IPv4 and thus can in a sensible
way
actually have multiple IPv4 candidates, and let the clients select
which
interface has the best reachability.

Can you please be explicit on what in ICE prevents things to work for
IPv4 but
the same case works for IPv6?
This is text from RFC 5245. I agree it is confusing, and unfortunately I
don¹t have a good answer.

I guess my approach would be to suggest that we simply remove the
restriction. In addition, there is generic text about dual-stack etc
elsewhere,
and I don¹t see anything ICE lite specific.

OLD:

"Lite implementations only utilize host candidates.  A lite
     implementation MUST, for each component of each data stream,
allocate
     zero or one IPv4 candidates.  It MAY allocate zero or more IPv6
candidates, but no more than one per each IPv6 address utilized by
     the host.  Since there can be no more than one IPv4 candidate per
     component of each data stream, if an ICE agent has multiple IPv4
     addresses, it MUST choose one for allocating the candidate.  If a
     host is dual-stack, it is RECOMMENDED that it allocate one IPv4
     candidate and one global IPv6 address.  With the lite
implementation,
     ICE cannot be used to dynamically choose amongst candidates.
     Therefore, including more than one candidate from a particular scope
     is NOT RECOMMENDED, since only a connectivity check can truly
     determine whether to use one address or the other."


NEW:

"Lite implementations only utilize host candidates.
With the lite implementation, ICE cannot be used to dynamically choose
amongst candidates. Therefore, including more than one candidate from a
particular IP address family is NOT RECOMMENDED, since only a
connectivity
check can Truly determine whether to use one address or the other."
I have read Ben's comment on this issue. I think something needs to be
done to avoid the confusion. There are I think two alternatives,
either retain the restriction with an added note on why this restriction
exists. The second I think is to go with an amended version of the text
proposal, possibly with even clearer wording that if you are running
multiple addresses in the same family, you should really should be using
a full implementation.

I noted that the "NEW" text above needs an amendment, and that is
because I think a very important part of what was cut needs to be
retained.

It MAY allocate zero or more IPv6
candidates, but no more than one per each IPv6 address utilized by
    the host.

If one generalize this what is missing is the limitation that only a
single candidate per IP address utilized by the host can be added by a
lite implementation. Using multiple would be redundant, but lets use a
direct statement to this affect, rather than a subordinate clause to  a
MAY statement.
Could you suggest new text?

What about:

"Lite implementations only utilize host candidates. For each IP address, independent of IP address family, there MUST be zero or one candidate. With the lite implementation, ICE cannot be used to dynamically choose amongst candidates. Therefore, including more than one candidate from a
particular IP address family is NOT RECOMMENDED, since only a connectivity
check can Truly determine whether to use one address or the other. Instead agents that have multiple public IP addresses are RECOMMENDED to run full ICE implementations to ensure the best usage of its addresses."




---


B. Section 6.1.1:

     An agent MUST be prepared that the peer might re-determine the
roles
     as part of any ICE restart, even if the criteria for doing so are
not
     fulfilled.  This can happen if the peer is compliant with an older
     version of this specification.

What does it mean to be prepared for a peer that re-determine the
roles?
What
is it one MUST do? If the peer changes its role upon an ICE restart,
isn't that
going to result in a role mismatch? Thus causing yet another ICE
restart,
where
also this peer will re-evalute? Isn't that good enough? Or is it
something else
it can do?
The roles are re-negotiated during the ICE restart: it may, or may not,
result in a role mismatch.

"Prepared" means that the peer might change its role even though it does
not fulfil the 5245bis criteria for being allowed to do so.
Yes, but prepared is not actionable. I guess what you mean is that an
implementation MUST accept and perform re-determination of the role
initiated by the peer agent, even if the criteria are not fulfilled.
What about:

OLD:

An agent MUST be prepared that the peer might re-determine the roles
      as part of any ICE restart, even if the criteria for doing so are not
      fulfilled.  This can happen if the peer is compliant with an older
      version of this specification.


NEW:

An agent MUST accept if the peer initiates a re-determination of the roles
even if the criteria for doing so are not fulfilled. This can happen if the
peer is compliant with RFC 5245.

Yes, I think that is much clearer and indicates what might occur, and what to do in the case and why.

---

...

D. Section 6.1.4.2:

I don't know if I misunderstand the algorithm here in the bullet list.
To
me it
appears that it will terminate prior to have initiated all possible
tests, as
it appears that it will not unfreeze some of the candidate pairs. If
one
have
tests running for a foundation, but all other candidate checks have
been
started, then the steps are aborted. Is the bullet list rechecked every
Ta?
No. Whenever Ta fires, one check list in Running state is checked. When
all check lists have been checked, it will start over from the top of
the
list.

Or, did I misunderstand your issue?
No, It was unclear that this is re-run every time Ta fires. I think the
reason for this is this sentence in step 4.

If this happens for every single check list in the
        Running state, meaning there are no remaining candidate pairs to
        perform connectivity checks for, abort these steps.

It was unclear to me that this doesn't mean aborting the whole
procedure. Because if the requirement is fulfilled then there is nothing
to do until the next Ta, which will possible unfreeze another candidate
pair in step 2. I would recommend that you reformulate this sentence to
make it clear that the processing for this Ta is stopped, and processing
will be resumed the next time Ta fires.
Isn¹t that indicated in the sentence before the list:

  "Whenever Ta fires, the ICE agent will perform a check for a candidate
   pair within the picked check list by performing the following steps:²

Yes, assuming you correctly interpret those. Which, I clearly didn't that is why I am requesting additional clarity. But, if you think it is good enough, I will let the issue drop.


---

E. Section 7.2.5.2.2.  ICMP Error

     An ICE agent MAY support processing of ICMP errors for connectivity
     checks.  If the agent supports processing of ICMP errors, and if a
     Binging request generates an ICMP error, the agent SHOULD set the
     state of the candidate pair to Failed.

I am a bit worried by this blanket statement on ICMP errors. I think it
should
be clarified which ICMP message types that are relevant to consider as
errors?
I assume Type 3 (Destination Unreachable) but maybe not all responde
codes as
Codes 4, 11,12 may be addressable in other ways, and likely Type 11
(Time
exceeded) with response code 0, response code 1 is not a clear
indication
of a
non working path.
This is from RFC 5245.

I don¹t think the ICE WG should go through all different codes and
combinations, and determine what should be considered an error, and what
not.

If you can provide something (table, guidance etc), we are happy to
include it. Otherwise I¹d like to keep it as it is, and let
implementations deal with it, as at least I am not aware that this would
Have caused issues in ICE deployments.
I think we there is a point to clarify that this applies to ICMP
messages indicating a non-usable path. So maybe it could be rewritten to
something like this:

    An ICE agent MAY support processing of ICMP messaging indicating a
non-functioning path for connectivity
    checks. ICMP messages of type 3 (Destination Unreachable) are
indicators of a currently non-functioning path. However, the issue can be
temporary as it can depend on routing transients, this for example
applies to codes 0, 1 and 5. Other messages that appear to indicate
non-functioning path such as Type=11 (Time Exceeded) with code=0 (Time to
Live exceeded in Transit) are not clear indicator as the IP packets
potentially can reach the destination with a larger TTL value set at
transmission. Therefore, implementation needs to analyse the different
ICMP messages types and codes for which it considers the path as
non-functioning. If the agent supports processing of ICMP errors, and if a
    Binging request generates an ICMP error, the agent SHOULD set the
    state of the candidate pair to Failed.


What also is not addressed in this is the risk of denial of service
attacks using spoofed ICMP messages to shutdown certain connectivity
checks. The security considerations lack any discussion of this issue.
If ICMP processing are retained, I think a recommendation about
validation is needed to avoid at least off path attackers from doing
these attacks easily. Unfortunately ICMP response will only include the
IP/UDP header, thus no data from the STUN messages which would allow
verification that the ICMP messages matches an actually sent check.

It may be simplest to recommend against reacting to ICMP errors from
both the perspective that it is a risk for denial of service attack, as
well as that it represents a risk terminating connectivity checks for a
transient issue. From my perspective I expect this to reduce the number
of sent connectivity checks very little
So, are you saying that an agent should simply ignore ICMP messages?

Yes, I think that may be the best. There are a bit to many corner cases and significant attack surface that getting all the details right are significant work for a relatively small reduction in sent connection check messages.



---

...

H. Section 14.3:

      Num-Waiting: the number of checks in the check list in the
      Waiting state.

      Num-In-Progress: the number of checks in the In-Progress state.

Is "the number of checks" only per single checklist or across all the
check
lists?
Per single check list.
Section 14.1 says: "Those formulas scale
    with N, the number of checks to be performed."

But, from my perspective, that number N is not on a single checklist,
but for the whole ICE session, i.e. all the checklists. Thus, I think
there needs a clarification on why this is per checklist, making it
clear why these two things match up.
Actually, I think I was wrong. It is per check list SET, i.e., all check
lists.

So, please correct the language to be clear on that it is across the whole check list set.


---

I. Section 17.2.3:

When VAD is being
    used, keepalives will be sent during silence periods.

I would claim that this is only true for when VAD without any comfort
noise is
used. A lot of codecs with VAD operations still generates comfort noise
on a
frequency of a couple packets a second, way more often then the minimal
for ICE
keep-alives.
What about:

"In deployments that are not utilizing Voice Activity Detection (VAD),
without any comfort noise,
the keepalives are never..."
That is also not true. As keep-alives is not expected to be needed for:
1. Continous media withouth any VAD etc.
2. Media with VAD, but with comfort noise not allowing intervals to be
to long (<=1 second).
What about:

OLD:

In deployments that are not utilizing Voice Activity Detection (VAD), the
keepalives are never
    used and there is no increase in bandwidth usage.  When VAD is being
    used, keepalives will be sent during silence periods.  This involves
    a single packet every 15-20 seconds, far less than the packet every
    20-30 ms that is sent when there is voice.  Therefore, keepalives
    don't have any real impact on capacity planning.



NEW:

In deployments with continuous media and without utilizing Voice Activity
Detection (VAD),
or deployments where VAD is utilized together with short interval (max 1
second) comfort noise,
the keepalives are never used and there is no increase in bandwidth usage.
  When VAD is being
    Used without comfort noise, keepalives will be sent during silence
periods.  This involves
    a single packet every 15-20 seconds, far less than the packet every
20-30 ms that is sent when
there is voice.  Therefore, keepalives don't have any real impact on
capacity planning.

Looks good.


=======

  Minor/Editorial Issues:

...

7. Section 7.3:

If the agent is using Diffserv Codepoint markings [RFC2475] in its
     data packets, it SHOULD apply the same markings to Binding
responses.

I find this sentence a bit unclear. Is it intended to say:

If the agent receiving the binding request, intended to use DSCP
markings
!=0
for the data, it SHOULD set, the same marking to binding responses.

or

If the agent receives a binding request with DSCP markings, then it
should
apply to corresponding code point when forming the binding response?
It means that it will use the same markings in Binding responses that it
uses in data packets (audio, video, etc).
Okay, I wonder if it is the temporal aspect of the sentence that makes
it harder for me to parse correctly.
There are unclarity of which agent is referenced and whom "it" is in the
sentence.
It is the STUN server.

Would the following be more clear?

"If the agent is using Diffserv Codepoint markings [RFC2475] in data
packets that it sends, the agent SHOULD apply the same markings to Binding
responses."

Yes, except that I stumbles "it sends" where it is more likely "it will
send" is the correct form.
"If the agent is using Diffserv Codepoint markings [RFC2475] in data
packets that it will send, the agent SHOULD apply the same markings to
Binding
Responses that it will send."

Yes. works for me.



---

8. Section 8.3.1:

    The procedures in Section 8 require that an ICE agent continue to
    listen for STUN requests and continue to generate triggered checks
    for a data stream, even once processing for that stream completes.

That reference to Section 8, should that in fact be to Section 8.1
specifically? It looks strange with a self reference, which in some
aspect a
reference to section 8 means.
I think this issue was missed.
Sorry for that.

The text can be removed, because it refers to text further down in the
same subsection (first sentence of second paragraph).

Yes, removing that sentence works for me.


---

9. Section 15:

4.57566E+18 (note that
    an implementation would represent this as a 64-bit integer so as not
    to lose precision).

Why the floating point representation? Priorities are integer numbers
and
thus
should be presented as such in this example.
This is from RFC 5245, and unfortunately I don¹t know.
Can you not just calculate the 64-bit integer and write it out?
So, you want me to write 4575660000000000000?

No, I thought the pair priority will not be 0 for the lower 32 bits and that there actually are overflow in this deduction. My understanding is that what should be written here is the calculation of:

pair priority = 2^32*MIN(G,D) + 2*MAX(G,D) + (G>D?1:0)

Where G and D are the priority values for $L_PRIV_1 and $R_PUB_1.

$L_PRIV_1 is L's host candidate, and stated to have a priorty of 2130706431

$R_PUB_1 is R's host candidate and stated to have a priorty of 2130706431

So G = 2130706431 and D=2130706431

pair priority then becomes 2^32*2130706431 + 2*2130706431 + 0 = 9151314442783293438

Thus, I think the next two pair priorities in the example also needs to be fixed.

The first pair priority for R is the same value as for L, as G and D are identical. But the next value will be different. To my understanding L will be controlling, i.e. L's candidate will be G

G=1694498815
D= 2130706431

Pair priority = 2^32*1694498815+2*2130706431 + 0 = 7277816997797167102



Cheers

Magnus Westerlund

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Media Technologies, Ericsson Research
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Torshamnsgatan 23           | Mobile +46 73 0949079
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