>I agree strongly with you: the IETF needs to do something in some direction. > >That something could be to properly reject email with a DMARC policy that >does not permit forwarding. That would piss off an awful lot of IETF >participants, but it would be simple, since it requires no protocol >changes, just social changes. Hmmn, the one approach that is unambiguously worse than doing nothing, since it would confirm every worst fear that we're more interested in playing purity games than in getting work done. If we actually want to do something, we should decide what to do and do it. It's not like there's any mystery about what the options are. This page in the old ASRG wiki lists them all and hasn't changed in ages: http://wiki.asrg.sp.am/wiki/Mitigating_DMARC_damage_to_third_party_mail The options built into mailman 2 are: * moderate or reject DMARC'ed submissions * rewrite the From: line with the list address * wrap messages sort of like one-message digests Personally, I think those are all pretty bad, so we should do something else. (If I had to pick one, I'd pick the last one since it's the easiest to undo on the way in.) Anything else would require some development. I am one of the few IETF participants who has actually written anti-DMARC code for mailing lists, so I have some idea of how much work it is. My preferred approach until ARC is usable is to rewrite the From: address to a legible forwarding address. The IETF already handles a bazillion forwarding addresses for I-D and RFC authors, so I'd think it wouldn't be terribly hard to adapt that. You don't have to change any mailman code; you can do everything in a shim between the list manager and the outgoing postfix submission program. My form is marissa@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,* but if wildcard MX records are scary, it could be marissa-yahoo.com@xxxxxxxxxxxx. Having done this before, I know it's not terribly hard, and I'd be happy to help make it work. R's, John * - yes, dmarc.fail is a real domain. If the IETF asks nicely, I'd be happy to give you dmarc.wtf.