Hi.
Largely in response to the call from Andrew and others to post
an actual I-D with an alternate proposal, I've just posted
draft-klensin-iaoc-member-01. Note that this is a -01 version
of one of the proposals, referred to in a few postings, to
reform the IAOC membership (and the IAB and IETF Chair roles in
it) a few years ago. It differs from the earlier version in
several respects, but the most important one is that it contains
considerable discussion and rationale for what is being
proposed, probably saving readers of this list some rather long
email messages from me.
A few things it does not address, or makes proposals about, that
are different from what I think have been trends on the list are
worth calling out:
--On Wednesday, February 03, 2016 15:30 +1300 Brian E Carpenter
<brian.e.carpenter@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> I think the IETF Chair slot is a different matter. Yes, the
> IETF Chair is also the IESG Chair, but I don't believe s/he is
> in the IAOC on behalf of the IESG. On the contrary, it's on
> behalf of the IETF. I think it's exactly right that the IETF
> Chair votes in the IAOC, because nobody else has the same
> overview, and also because I believe that any IETF Chair who
> did not closely track the IAOC's business would be
> irresponsible.
I believe most of the reasoning above but not the conclusion.
I do think that, under normal circumstances, the IETF Chair
would be the right appointee from the IESG. However, I think
that unusual circumstances might arise -- that someone else
might be a better choice or that an IETF Chair might be faced
with a choice of doing a good job on a few things or a bad job
on many or that a Nomcom might look at someone and say "really
good IETF Chair material but a bad candidate for the IAOC" --
and that it is more sensible to give the IESG the discretion to
sort that out. As far as "on behalf of the IETF", that is why
the Nomcom selects several IAOC members and there are proposals
floating around to increase that number or percentage. The
IESG (and, in particular, the IETF Chair) are likely to have
some special insights but, unless those can be effectively
communicated and the rest of the IAOC persuaded, we are talking,
not about better representation of positions but about
concentration of power (comments about "kings" incorporated by
reference).
Note that the draft contains appendices that discuss other
changes it doesn't make, either because I (and my reading of at
least parts of the list discussion) believe they would be bad
ideas or because they lie outside the scope of the document as
now defined. The most important of those is the question of
whether we have reached the point that we should partially or
completely separate the membership of the IAOC from the Trustees
of the IETF Trust. Comments in Appendix A.2 of the new I-D
address that issue to some extent.
best,
john