[Try the second] On Sat, Dec 26, 2015 at 10:11 PM, John C Klensin <john-ietf@xxxxxxx> wrote: > > > --On Saturday, December 26, 2015 9:52 PM -0500 Phillip > Hallam-Baker <phill@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >>... >> One of the issues people don't seem to consider in these >> schemes is that merely reducing the number of trusted >> intermediaries from ~40 to one doesn't actually remove >> reliance on trusted third parties, it merely removes all >> choice in the matter. > > And even that equation tends to be complicated by the > observation that the trust relationship, as far as certification > of identity is concerned, is with the registrars (and, in some > cases, their agents and resellers) rather than with the > registries. At that point, the number of trusted intermediaries > gets back toward order 40 or 100, not one, unless the question > is "do you control this domain" rather than "are you who you say > you are". The question the WebPKI was designed to answer is 'are you accountable'. The original brief was to make buying 'stuff' online as safe as in person at a bricks and mortar store. The basic approach was to establish a degree of accountability, to make it infeasible for an attacker to acquire credentials at a rate that would make online fraud profitable. One of the things that irritates me is that in the original design, one of the principal controls used to ensure this goal was met was revocation, canceling credentials when a party defects. I can't stop a criminal registering a business but I can pull their certificate in 24 hours. But the applications don't see the need for this particular control or at least not in a fashion that is actually effective.. Which is rather odd since if there actually was a trust crisis in the WebPKI you would expect that complaints about insufficiently fast revocation would be at least as loud as complaints about mis-issue.