Re: Checksum at IP layer - is it even needed ?

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On Wed, Dec 16, 2015 at 1:51 PM, Saku Ytti <saku@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 16 December 2015 at 13:01, Alexey Eromenko <al4321@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> We can't defend vs Mangling devices fully, sadly. (without encryption)
>> What if data-mangling device (NAT), changes port, and re-computes new
>> good checksum on it... ?
>> Server will accept a valid-data of a packet, that doesn't belong to the
>
> Being self-centered bastard I don't care about NAT or other devices
> which intentionally mangle packets. Protecting against them is not
> priority to me. If the data mangling happens in Internet core, it
> affects everyone, it's priority that those issues are recognised at
> the next hop, so that it's easy to identify which node mangled it.
> It's WAY smaller problem domain when you're faced with 'there are some
> mangled packets' when everyone who complains happens to behind
> specific NAT box. Compared to if it's some tier1 router is silently
> mangling, complaints can come anywhere in the world, triangulating
> that to one specific router in the world is slow and expensive (i.e.
> not gonna happen).
>

But if so, making a stronger layer 4 checksum can also solve this problem.
i.e. TCP with CRC32 or CRC64, instead of loosy 16-bit checksum.

It will solve the "core router" and the "important Ethernet switch"
mangling problem.

-- 
-Alexey Eromenko "Technologov"




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