Re: [dane] PGP security models, was Summary of IETF LC for draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey

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On 09/22/2015 05:11 PM, Paul Wouters wrote:
> On Tue, 22 Sep 2015, John C Klensin wrote:
>
>> However, if you believe that, because of trust issues, people
>> get keys only from personal contacts rather than indirectly from
>> public databases, why are we discussing yet another public
>> database-based approach?   Or are you convinced that the problem
>> with the other public databases is that the DNS is inherently
>> better for some reason such as the inability of third parties
>> not associated with the domain in the address to add keys?
>
> Yes.
>
> The other common use problem is not being able to delete keys, so you end
> up using a keyserver, get a (verified by WoT) key and then in response
> you get a plaintext message saying "I forgot my passphrase so i cannot
> delete/revoke my old key". With DNS, you can remove the key from DNS
> without needing the private key or passphrase to it.
>
> Paul
>
Actually the DNS manipulation is not deleting a key; it's preventing it
from being found.

Revocation is "I, the signer of this revocation, declare that this key
is not worthy of trust".
(the difference between a CRL and a PGP-style revocation is who signs
the revocation - both have their place in the pantheon of web-of-trust
models.)

Deleting from the DNS is just making the key (and its signatures) harder
to find.




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