Re: PGP security models, was Summary of IETF LC for draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey

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I think Paul nails it, at least for the more aware folks around.  Using the WoT to gauge anything other than confidence in choice of friends/associates is asking for trouble.
See Also:  Robin Sage :  en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robin_Sage

manning
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On 21September2015Monday, at 12:14, Paul Wouters <paul@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> On Mon, 21 Sep 2015, John Levine wrote:
> 
>>> OPENPGP is a data format, WoT is one way to employ that format to
>>> exchange messages.   It is not a *required* way to use OPENPGP.
>> 
>> Sure, but it's the way that everyone has used PGP for 20 years,
>> and it's the security model that everyone I know expects when they
>> use PGP keys.
> 
> Actually, nmost people I know never use the WoT. They only use keys
> obtained directly from the person they want to exchange encrypted email
> with.
> 
>> This draft uses a model in which the key is bound to a mailbox
> 
> openpgp keys are bound to ID's, which can ultimately end up in a
> mailbox but is not required to do so.
> 
> For instance, the gpg key used to sign fedora21 packages with an openpgp
> key ID containing "fedora21@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" might not have any mailbox
> associated with it. It is merely shared in the DNS under an email address,
> without a mailbox or valid local-part.
> 
>> any stronger identity, and you have to trust that the domain's
>> management fairly represents its users
> 
> Correct, the domain's management that controls either DNS or SMTP servers,
> can steal a users email.
> 
>> That's not a ridiculous model, but if
>> that's the model, the draft and draft-ietf-dane-openpgpkey-usage need
>> to say so.  At this point, neither does.
> 
>> From the Introduction:
> 
>   This document specifies a method for publishing and
>   locating OpenPGP public keys in DNS for a specific email address
>   using a new OPENPGPKEY DNS Resource Record.  Security is provided via
>   DNSSEC.
> 
> So your point is made already pretty clear in the introduction
> already. Security comes from DNSSEC, so whoever controls the domain,
> controls the publishing of openpgp keys.
> 
> Section 5.2 also contains some advise. Section 7.4 also mentions this,
> but not under a section title that makes that very clear.
> 
> Some clarifications will be made, especially in the security
> considerations section, to clarify this, based on the IETF LC comments.
> 
> Thank you,
> 
> Paul
> 





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