On Saturday, July 11, 2015, Christian Huitema <huitema@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Saturday, July 11, 2015 8:50 AM, joel jaeggli wrote
> ...
> [5] Section 5:
>
> Fake
> DHCP servers / fake RAs are currently a security concern - this
> doesn't make them any better or worse.
>
> Please cite a reference for this, preferably with operational
> recommendations on limiting these problems (e.g., ensure that DHCP and
> RA traffic cannot be injected from outside/beyond the network that is relevant to the portal).
There is definitely an attack vector there. Suppose an attacker can monitor the traffic, say on an unencrypted Wi-Fi hot spot. The attacker can see a DHCP request or INFORM, and race in a fake response with an URL of their own choosing. The mark's computer automatically connects there, and download some zero-day attack. Bingo!
An attacker with this level of access can already do this. They fake a DHCP response with themselves as the gateway and insert a 302 into any http connection. Or, more likely they simply inject malicious code into some connection.
Connecting to unknown/ unencrypted networks is inherently dangerous...
W
-- Christian Huitema
--
I don't think the execution is relevant when it was obviously a bad idea in the first place.
This is like putting rabid weasels in your pants, and later expressing regret at having chosen those particular rabid weasels and that pair of pants.
---maf