Re: [TLS] Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-03.txt> (TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade Attacks) to Proposed Standard

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> On Jan 17, 2015, at 7:07 AM, Jeffrey Walton <noloader@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 4:04 PM, Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>> Hanno Böck <hanno@xxxxxxxxx>:
>> 
>>> I think this adds further evidence that adding another workaround layer
>>> (SCSV) is the wrong thing to do. Instead browsers should just stop
>>> doing weird things with protocols that compromise security and drop
>>> the protocol dance completely.
>> 
>> Also, quite clearly, we can't yet know how the TLS 1.3 (1.4, 1.5, ...)
>> rollout will work out.
>> 
> The WG should be solving problems that do exist; and not manufactured
> problems or theoretical future problems that don't exist.

They’re not theoretical. Servers that do not tolerate (0x03,0x04) in ClientHello exist *now*. Surprisingly, some of those do support TLS 1.2 and Renegotiation Info. Unless those are all gone by the time browsers roll out TLS 1.3, there will be a problem to solve.

Yoav





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