On Wednesday, August 06, 2014 10:09:27 Paul Wouters wrote: > On Wed, 6 Aug 2014, Dave Crocker wrote: > > Best Effort Encryption > > That's actually a pretty good term. It can range from better than > nothing (no key management, with fallback to clear) to mutually > authenticated encryption (key management, no fallback to clear). And > even include TOFU. > > The biggest problem with Opportunistic Security I have is that security > is so much more than just encryption, but our current efforts against > pervasive monitoring are mostly about encryption and optionally (though > preferably) with some authentication. I don't see why it's better to pick a more narrowly scoped term, just because current efforts are more narrowly scoped. I think that having a broad term like OS defined is useful in that it covers other possibilities when they come up. As Viktor has mentioned, OS is a term that isn't inherently tied to a specific protocol or security requirement. I think that's a good thing. It's a useful concept to use in the process of designing security into protocols. I was not involved in the saag discussions that led up to this, but I really like the term opportunistic security. I think it better captures the dynamics of what's intended by the concept. Scott K