On 5/14/2014 8:39 AM, John C Klensin wrote:
The combined
effect seems to weaken both DMARC and mailing lists.
So? Perhaps we should be focusing more on strategies that
weaken DMARC to the degree necessary or appropriate without
weakening mailing lists or imposing added costs on those who
operate or subscribe to them.
The analogy is obviously not exact, but, if some external group
came up with a protocol that weakened TCP and undermined all of
our congestion control mechanisms, we might be pointing out the
damage and encouraging people to not use that protocol --
perhaps even figuring out ways to block its use -- but would not
be scurrying to alter TCP to better accommodate the behavior of
that new protocol, especially if the alterations made "normal"
use of TCP less efficient or effective.
John,
Right, its not the same analogy when you consider the IETF did now
change "TCP" with a now new IETF STD level change/addition to TCP.
The problem has alway been that the change was for a last signer trust
model at the expense of original source policy model which the
industry clearly desired if TCP was going to be now potentially
challenged with new TCP signature stamps.
--
HLS