On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 11:21 AM, Dave Crocker <dhc@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 4/25/2014 7:56 AM, Ned Freed wrote: >> >> An obvious counterexample is what recently happened in perpass and >> the various works it has started. Regardless of what anyone thinks of >> perpass or its outcome, a fair characterization is that it was an >> IETF repsonse to the message delivered by Snoden et al. > > > Yup. It's a singular example, but that's the point. It's not what the IETF > (usually) does. > > It's fine that it's being attempted and it might (or might not) prove > useful. But there is no pattern of the IETF doing such a thing. There is really no precedent for discovering that a rogue agency was conspiring to sabotage efforts to provide Internet security. It is not just the IETF that has ben responding in unusual ways. For the past thirty years we have been building a technology trap that civilization now depends on. And anyone who looks into the structure of that technology trap will realize that all the critical infrastructure is now linked to the net in ways that can create enormous amounts of fear and panic albeit with little risk of catastrophic consequences. Fear and panic are themselves capable of creating serious consequences, consider that the response to 9/11 was to start not just one but two wars. And now we find that the government agency charged with COMSEC assurance was actually committing resources to subverting COMSEC efforts. In many cases efforts that were funded by other parts of the US government. This is really not a usual situation at all. -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/