I share these concern. Stewart Sent from my iPad > On 19 Jan 2014, at 08:30, "Eliot Lear" <lear@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > Jari, > > I oppose changes made to the document in the last round as stated below. If they remain, I would urge publication as Informational and not BCP: > >> In particular, architectural decisions, including which existing >> technology is re-used, may significantly impact the vulnerability of >> a protocol to PM. Those developing IETF specifications therefore >> need to consider mitigating PM when making these architectural >> decisions and be prepared to justify their decisions. Getting >> adequate, early review of architectural decisions including whether >> appropriate mitigation of PM can be made is important. Revisiting >> these architectural decisions late in the process is very costly. > > In the fact of a lack of common understanding regarding the threat, this text can subject a working group to abuse and confusion. This isn't theoretical, as it has happened in the past that working group chairs and area directors in particular have derailed efforts, setting standardization and deployment of useful technology back years, and this wasn't that long ago. > > Let's make this discussion concrete with a few examples: the implications may be that a working group chair or any participant (although chairs are in a very good position to cause damage) could insist that DHCP not be used to carry new attributes because there is no common understanding of the scope of remediation that will be required. Before certain ADs roll their eyes, the discussion gets derailed as follows: > > >> I propose the following DHCP option to configure my new frob. > << But DHCP is transmitted in the clear. Please justify this decision. > (or worse) << and by the way here is my very heavy weight alternative that requires a valid cert chain > >> It's meant for the local wire. > << But we don't know the scope of the attack. > ... > ... > >> Nevermind, I'll just use a vendor extension. Goodbye. > > Rinse and repeat with any other protocol that allows extensions. > > It is fair to say that we should consider this threat at an architectural level. It's fair (albeit a truism) that finding design flaws earlier in the process rather than later is less costly (ENG-101). Justification language like the above, however, is likely to actively impede the IETF, as these sorts of things have in the past. > > Eliot