Hi, On 1/6/14 11:45 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > On 01/06/2014 08:51 PM, John Curran wrote: >> What happens when the IETF makes a decision that particular "public policy" requirements >> are _to be considered_ (perpass), or specifically _not to be considered_ (RFC 2804) in protocol >> development? > I think that's a mis-characterisation. IMO both of those are cases > where there are sound technical reasons for the IETF to do, or not > do, work. Yes, those have impacts, but the public policy angle (if > that's the right term) is a side-effect and is not the reason for > the decision. > Why do we state that confidentiality is important to pursue in our protocols? That is a political decision made by the community. We then layer on top of that decision technical requirements. IMHO it's a very important and good political decision. We struggle with such decisions all the time. That there is a single root is both a technical AND a political decision. ICANN wouldn't be quite the political focal point if there were a reasonable technical approach that scaled to the size of the Internet that allowed for multiple roots. As a community we know this and have accepted it. That pervasive surveillance can be used for good or bad reduces the political element in as much as we're not saying any particular use is good or bad. That as a matter of IETF policy we may view it on the whole as a bad thing is itself a political decision because it is fundamentally tied to confidentiality and privacy (which is even more a political area than confidentiality). Nothing is wrong with making political decisions from time to time, when it's important to do so, in order to see to a growing Internet that provides benefit to the broader society. Eliot ps: I'll have more to say about perpass later today.