Hi. I strongly support the consensus statements that were the sense of the room at the IETF 88 technical plenary. I strongly support publication of a document like this, but I believe this document should provide more guidance before publication. We have a history of publishing vaguely worded security BCPs that are really hard on our area directors and chairs. As an AD, I found aspects of RFC 3352, BCP 61 and RFC 4107 very challenging. The big questions tended to surround protocols already in progress and architectural re-use. Let's not do that again. Protocols already in progress is a fairly obvious problem. I don't think we want Stephen and Sean to hold a DISCUSS on every document on the telechat following approval of this BCP because none of them explain how they mitigate pervasive monitoring. Stephen and Sean wouldn't do something that ridiculous, but I believe they and the community could use better guidance than "use good judgment." I know as a document author, chair and former AD I sure could. my recommendation is that protocols with no significant solution work accepted by a WG need to address this BCP the same way new protocols would. Protocols with significant solution work within a WG need to address this BCP to the extent that doing so is consistent with the existing work antd doesn't involve reopening decisions that would otherwise be closed or revisiting earlier stages in the process that would not otherwise be revisited. So, if you haven't decided on your security mechanism yet, take this into account. If you're working on security considerations but your protocol is basically done, write up how well you did but don't revisit things. If you're in last call, move on as usual. The architectural re-use question is harder to explain. Imagine you're desiging something new. You could use enum-like things or some other directory. It would be convenient to use DNS because similar technologies you care about use DNS. If you use DNS, then people can more easily monitor the queries to your service. How much do you need to consider pervasive monitoring in your technology choice. We've had this sort of thing come up lots with previous security BCPs; I most especially remember being told by PCE that they had chosen not to follow RFC 4107 because they wanted to be like other routing protocols and use TCP-AO even though it doesn't provide key management. The issue of architecture re-use is important to discuss in the community because it significantly affects how much impact this BCP will have. If we say "use good judgment," and nothing more, then we're basically leaving it entirely up to the WGs, because cross-area-review time is really late for telling someone they need a new fundamental technology. Obviously the WG will have significant impact on this, but I think if we provide useful guidance here it can really help. My personal preference is that this BCP should impact future architectural choices more than RFC 4107 has managed to but that architectural re-use is quite important. A related issue is how to treat extensions to existing protocols. Again we've had a lot of heart-ache from not specifying that. I think it is important for the community to receive guidance on these issues. I think it would be fine for this BCP to delegate that guidance. I'd support a paragraph describing each issue plus a paragraph saying that the IESG would provide guidance if the IESG would be willing to do that. Obviously that would mean we're trusting the IESG to make that decision; I'd be happy to do that. I'd also be happy to work on guidance to be included in the BCP on these issues. I do not support the document remaining silent on these issues. Please, whatever you do, remove section 3 on the process note. As it stands, it reads as follows: * We're unable to find a way for the IESG and IAB to publish a document together * We really wish the IESG and IAB could publish a document together bbut reluctantly being unable to do that we'll settle for a community consensus document. If you must say something how about: In the past, architectural statements of this sort have been published as joint products of the IESG and IAB. This document represents the community consensus of the IETF and was published in accordance with the processes in affect at time of publication. In particular, I think a community statement of the whole community is stronger than a joint IAB/IESG work product. I'd hope that the IESG and IAB would support the team and say that "Hey, we're part of the community, and a community consensus is how we present really strong statements." The IAB also has an ISOC role beyond the IETF. If they want to emphasize support in that role, they could release a statement on their own making that clear. However I think it would be more powerful if the IAB worked with ISOC to release such a statement and was included in that statement. I'm also still sputtering at the idea that our leadership cannot find a way within the current process for the IESG and IAB to publish a document together ifg they wanted to. I don't think that would be desirable in this instance. We've changed and there's more focus on the community than there was in the RFC 1984 days. However, I hope that if it were the right thing to do our leadership could work together and publish a joint document. The current text really sounds like you believe you couldn't. Let's try and be better team players than that. In response to other last call comments: I do not support the idea of taking the time to figure out how each WG is impacted by this document. I understand the desire to figure out whether we have consensus that pervasive monitoring is a threat quickly. If we find that we have some open issues to resolve like the ones I bring up, but that we have consensus on the basic point, we have a quick way forward. Jari could announce that the consensus of the IETF 88 plenary has been confirmed on the list and we could move forward. It's rare that the IETF acts in plenary, but not rare that we make consensus calls about the big points in documents while details are still open.