Re: Last Call: <draft-farrell-perpass-attack-02.txt> (Pervasive Monitoring is an Attack) to Best Current Practice

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Hi,

> On 12/06/2013 06:49 PM, t.p. wrote:
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Stefan Winter" <stefan.winter@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> To: <ietf@xxxxxxxx>
>> Sent: Friday, December 06, 2013 10:15 AM
>>
> 
>> If encryption makes terrorism, crime and so on more likely, then we
>> could see countries impose restrictions on encryption in the same way as
>> for guns, and a few years down the line, the role of the IETF in
>> encouraging the use of strong encryption could be seen as a serious
>> misjudgment, one that is damaging to the standing of the IETF.

Uh. At least my mail client indents the above as if it was me making
this ridiculous statement.

Disclaimer: that fine example of misguided thinking above is Tom Petch's
alone.

Stefan

> 
> Wow. The IETF already has a consensus on the use of strong
> crytopgraphy. And has had for 17 years. Please read RFC 1984.
> If you have read it, I have no clue how you could accept it
> and make the above (spurious, but that's beside the point)
> argument. If you have read it, but don't accept it, then go
> right ahead and write a draft suggesting a replacement that
> fits your worldview better. If you have not read it, please
> do.
> 
> On 12/06/2013 06:57 PM, t.p. wrote:
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: "Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@xxxxxxxxx>
>> To: "Stefan Winter" <stefan.winter@xxxxxxxxxx>; <ietf@xxxxxxxx>
>> Sent: Friday, December 06, 2013 11:58 AM
>>>
>>> On 12/06/2013 10:15 AM, Stefan Winter wrote:
>>>> The TV manufacturer could have used it - they were simply stupid
>>>> enough to forget about it.
>>>
>>> I think in that case, the person who spotted the issue would
>>> also have considered it odd if ciphertext continued to be
>>> emitted after they had clicked the "don't send" button.
>>
>> The person who spotted the issue did click "don't send" and the messages
>> continued to be sent (according to the reports).  Which is, after all,
>> exactly what you would expect to see with good security - don't give the
>> other parties an opportunity to use traffic analysis to determine what
>> is going on.
> 
> My point was in response to your saying that that case
> demonstrated that ciphertext would prevented the person
> from knowing their TV was sending out messages when
> they didn't want that. The fact is in that case that
> any message ciphertext or plain would demonstrate that
> the TV is misbehaving. So your argument falls.
> 
> Cheers,
> S.
> 


-- 
Stefan WINTER
Ingenieur de Recherche
Fondation RESTENA - Réseau Téléinformatique de l'Education Nationale et
de la Recherche
6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
L-1359 Luxembourg

Tel: +352 424409 1
Fax: +352 422473

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