Re: Last Call: <draft-jabley-dnsext-eui48-eui64-rrtypes-03.txt> (Resource Records for EUI-48 and EUI-64 Addresses in the DNS) to Proposed Standard

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People were already storing MAC addresses in DNS for the reason given
in the draft and perhaps others, it is just that they were doing so in
a variety of proprietary ways.

Thanks,
Donald
=============================
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   +1-508-333-2270 (cell)
 155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA
 d3e3e3@xxxxxxxxx


On Mon, May 20, 2013 at 12:48 PM, SM <sm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> At 06:44 20-05-2013, The IESG wrote:
>>
>> The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider
>> the following document:
>> - 'Resource Records for EUI-48 and EUI-64 Addresses in the DNS'
>>   <draft-jabley-dnsext-eui48-eui64-rrtypes-03.txt> as Proposed Standard
>>
>> The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
>> final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
>> ietf@xxxxxxxx mailing lists by 2013-06-17. Exceptionally, comments may be
>
>
> This draft is about putting MAC addresses in the DNS.  The purpose is for IP
> address tracking by vendors.  As the RRTYPE has already been allocated it is
> useful to document the format.  In my humble opinion it is not a good idea
> to put MAC address in the DNS.  There is some text in Section 9 about why it
> may not be a good idea.  In Section 9:
>
>   "These potential concerns can be mitigated through restricting access
>    to zones containing EUI48 or EUI64 RRs or storing such information
>    under a domain name whose construction requires that the querier
>    already know some other permanent identifier."
>
> The "querier already know some other permanent identifier" reminds me of
> security through obscurity.  I'll do some selective quoting from another
> document:
>
>   "Once the MAC-derived suffix mechanism was standardized, it
>    was perceived to be required and therefore became part of compliance
>    suites, which continue to compel implementations to support it many
>    years after the associated vulnerabilities have been identified."
>
>   "A comprehensive privacy threat model was never developed (which seems
>    to be a recurring theme with older protocol development efforts)"
>
> The write-up mentions: "The intended status is standards track with the
> label of propsed standard".  Why is the intended status "Proposed Standard"?
>
> As a comment to Joe, the first line in Appendix A.2 was entertaining. :-)
>
> Regards,
> -sm




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