RE: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-krb-wg-otp-preauth-18

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Make that - Thanks for the quick response. (off-by-one key error ...)

Thanks,
--David


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Black, David
> Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2011 9:14 AM
> To: Sam Hartman
> Cc: Richards, Gareth; gen-art@xxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx; ietf-krb-wg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx;
> stephen.farrell@xxxxxxxxx; Black, David
> Subject: RE: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-krb-wg-otp-preauth-18
> 
> Hi Sam,
> 
> Thanks for the quick response?  I'll watch for the new text on anonymous PKINIT.
> 
> > Why should we require that alg-ids be registered URIs?
> 
> That's not my concern - the existing first paragraph of the IANA considerations section in the draft
> requires IANA registration (or at least tries to) by pointing to the PSKC registry.  My concern is
> that if this is going to be done, it needs to be done right (duh!), and the current text is
> insufficient. Please take the issue of whether to use IANA for this purpose up with Gareth and the WG.
> 
> > I have no problem with the IETF registering its algorithms there, or us
> > encouraging people to register them there, but it's a URI. What purpose
> > is served by forcing registration?
> 
> Hmm - more than one URI for the same algorithm might cause interoperability problems.
> 
> Thanks,
> --David
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Sam Hartman [mailto:hartmans-ietf@xxxxxxx]
> > Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2011 10:04 PM
> > To: Black, David
> > Cc: Richards, Gareth; gen-art@xxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx; ietf-krb-wg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; hartmans-
> > ietf@xxxxxxx; stephen.farrell@xxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-krb-wg-otp-preauth-18
> >
> > >>>>>   <david.black@xxxxxxx> writes:
> >
> >
> >     > [1] In section 6.1 at the top of p.28, I don't believe that the
> >     > use of lower case "recommended" is a strong enough warning about
> >     > the danger in using anonymous PKINIT because it exposes the OTP
> >     > value:
> >
> >     >    It is therefore recommended that anonymous PKINIT not be used
> >     > with OTP algorithms that require the OTP value to be sent to the
> >     > KDC and that careful consideration be made of the security
> >     > implications before it is used with other algorithms such as those
> >     > with short OTP values.
> >
> >     > At a minimum, that warning should be in upper-case:
> >
> >     >    It is therefore RECOMMENDED that anonymous PKINIT not be used
> >     > with OTP algorithms that require the OTP value to be sent to the
> >     > KDC. In addition, the security implications should be carefully
> >     > considered before anonymous PKINIT is used with other algorithms
> >     > such as those with short OTP values.
> >
> >     > Beyond that, the security issue in the first sentence may be
> >     > severe enough to justify a prohibition, so the following would
> >     > also be acceptable:
> >
> >     >    Therefore anonymous PKINIT SHALL NOT be used with OTP
> >     > algorithms that require the OTP value to be sent to the KDC. In
> >     > addition, the security implications should be carefully considered
> >     > before anonymous PKINIT is used with other algorithms such as
> >     > those with short OTP values.
> >
> > I definitely agree that we should use RFC 2119 language.
> > Note that WG participants have questioned this text in last call for
> > other reasons.
> > Many implementations use anonymous pkinit in a mode where the KDC's
> > certificate is verified--that is the client is anonymous but the KDC is
> > identified through a PKI.
> > WG participants believe (and I agree) that the security concern does not
> > apply at all in this case.
> > So, the text needs reworking.
> >
> >     > [2] In section 5, the first paragraph in the IANA considerations
> >     > is unclear, and following its reference to section 4.1, I don't
> >     > see any clarifying text there either.  I think Sections 4.1 and
> >     > 4.2 need to say that the value of otp-algID is a URI obtained from
> >     > the PSKC Algorithm URI Registry, and the first paragraph in
> >     > section 5 should say that URIs for otp-algID are to be registered
> >     > in that registry, see RFC 6030.
> >
> > Why should we require that alg-ids be registered URIs?  I.E. what is
> > wrong with me using
> > http://algorithms.painless-security.com/otp/best-thing-since-unsliced-bread
> > (or a tag URI if you like) for my OTP algorithm?
> > I have no problem with the IETF registering its algorithms there, or us
> > encouraging people to register them them, but it's a URI. What purpose
> > is served by forcing registration?

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