Hi Steve, It should be maybe clarified (if required) that this document does not create a new protocol/solution. It only defines extensions to an existing protocol (Diameter QoS Application), completing a standard list of AVPs in order to support a set of parameters already defined in other specifications. So, to be able to use this set of AVPs, you will have first to comply with the Diameter base protocol (RFC3588(bis)), the Diameter QoS application (RFC5866), the RFC 5624 defining the list of AVP, and all the different specifications defining these priority parameters. This document does not introduce new security issue. It just relies on existing solutions. I understand therefore the concerns from Ken. Regards, Lionel -----Message d'origine----- De : carlberg@xxxxxxxxxx [mailto:carlberg@xxxxxxxxxx] Envoyé : mardi 26 juillet 2011 13:24 À : Stephen Hanna Cc : ietf@xxxxxxxx; secdir@xxxxxxxx; draft-ietf-dime-priority-avps.all@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx; MORAND Lionel RD-CORE-ISS Objet : RE: secdir review of draft-ietf-dime-priority-avps-04 Steve, Quoting Stephen Hanna <shanna@xxxxxxxxxxx>: > Thanks for your response, Ken. > > Removing the last sentence that you quoted would make things worse. > Readers of this draft should definitely familiarize themselves with > the security considerations related to priority. We should make that > easier, not harder. The fact that those considerations also apply to > other RFCs does not remove the fact that they apply to this one also. but those considerations do not directly apply to DIAMETER. > You cannot publish a document whose security considerations section > says (as this one effectively does today), "There are lots of security > considerations related to this document. To understand them, please > dig through all the referenced documents and figure it out yourself." > Doing that digging and analysis is the job of the document editors. agreed, speaking in the general sense. But again, the security considerations of these other protocols do not apply to the operation of Diameter. > In order to ease the burden on you, I think a reasonable compromise > would be for YOU to review the documents referenced and decide which > have the most relevant security considerations. Then you could list > those explicitly in the last paragraph of the Security Considerations. I'm concerned about the implications of your recommendation. If we extend this position to other work in the IETF, then efforts like defining MIBs would mean that each MIB draft would need to perform a security considerations analysis of each protocol that an objects refers to in the context of SNMP. And one can extend the argument that each protocol operating on top of TCP (and/or UDP) and IP would need to perform an analysis on how TCP/UDP and IP may affect the upper layer protocol. We don't do that today. cheers, -ken _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf