On Tue, Aug 31, 2010 at 02:55:08PM +0800, Jiankang YAO <yaojk@xxxxxxxx> wrote a message of 11 lines which said: > I propose a lightweight DNSSEC. > > http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-yao-dnsext-msig-00.txt I've just read the draft and I'm not sure of the problem it intends to solve. There are two parts where DNSSEC could be regarded as "too heavy": 1) Administrative procedures, key management, resigning, etc. 2) Work for the name servers (loading large zones, sending large packets, validating, etc). MSIG addresses only the second. The first one, which was the cause of the failure for iab.org, is exactly the same as with the current DNSSEC. Even for the second, MSIG addresses a problem that we do not feel (for the signing of .FR, which will be on line next week, the size of the zone was the smallest problem) and creates a new problem: the authoritative name server now must generate a signature for every request! You will eat less RAM but use much more CPU. Also, if I understood the draft correctly: * Every authoritative name server, even a slave, will require a copy of the private key (since it will have to sign the responses on-the-fly). Bad for manageability and security. * MSIG secures the link from the authoritative name server to the resolver but cannot help if there are chained resolvers, or cannot be used for the last mile. (I'm not sure about this last point, it is not clear in the draft.) _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf