Re: Last Call: draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check (Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity in Certificates Used with Transport Layer Security) to Proposed Standard

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At 5:22 AM -0400 7/17/10, John C Klensin wrote:
>(1) In Section 4.4.1, the reference should be to the IDNA2008
>discussion.  The explanations are a little better vis-a-vis the
>DNS specs and it is a bad idea to reference an obsolete spec.

+1. I accept blame on this one, since I was tasked on an earlier version to bring the IDNA discussion up to date.

>(2) In Section 4.4.2, note that there are definitional and
>procedural problems if one tries to talk about a single rule for
>full domain names.  It is possible, and has been the only option
>until very recently, for a fully-qualified IDN to contain both
>"traditional" and "internationalized" labels.  IDNA2008 avoided
>a number of definitional problems by being defined strictly in
>terms of labels for just that reason.   In particular,
>conversion of an all-ASCII label to an A-label is undefined and
>meaningless: such a label is not a U-label and hence cannot be
>converted.  One needs to parse the string into labels, determine
>for each label whether it is "traditional" or
>"internationalized", and then apply the appropriate rule. I'd
>recommend rewriting 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 in terms of labels, not
>FQDNs.

Here we (may) disagree. 4.4.2 is already in terms of labels:
   If the source domain of a reference identifier is an
   internationalized domain name, then an implementation MUST convert
   every label in the domain name to an A-label before checking the
   domain anme.
Are you saying that the correct wording should elide "If the source domain of a reference identifier is an internationalized domain name, then" and just start at "An implementation MUST"? That would work for me.

>(3) Note that anything that requires that an application program
>parse a FQDN that might be an IDN into labels should probably
>have a Security Considerations note about the risks if various
>dotoids leak into the relevant environment.

Errrr, why should this document be forced to have such a warning when the IDNA2008 documents don't?

--Paul Hoffman, Director
--VPN Consortium
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