Hi Donald, as the document shepherd, I need to set the record straight on this, as your statement is simply false. In checking that the WGLC comments had been handled in the following document update, I looked at both the email thread you participated in and the updated document. In this case, the editor very clearly responded to your inputs and made significant changes to the document. You can find an entirely new section (9.7 Connectionless Resets) starting in version 09 of the draft, which specifically responds to your comments with resolutions that were discussed on the mailing list. This section discusses maintenance of the traffic keys across reboots which answers your concern and makes the practice a "SHOULD" which is stronger even than the "MAY" that you mention below. I do not understand why you feel like your inputs were ignored, but I hope that you'll agree that this was not the case. ________________________________________ From: tcpm-bounces@xxxxxxxx [tcpm-bounces@xxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Smith, Donald [Donald.Smith@xxxxxxxxx] Sent: Friday, February 26, 2010 2:45 PM To: 'ietf@xxxxxxxx'; 'IETF-Announce' Cc: 'tcpm@xxxxxxxx' Subject: Re: [tcpm] Last Call: draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt (The TCP Authentication Option) to Proposed Standard I have commented numerous times that with a paragraph that specifically provides vendors to make "connection-less resets == attack packets" this will not get much if any use among ISPs or other bgp speakers. Those statements have pretty much been ignored. I do not support this draft and believe I have wasted my time trying to explain why to someone that is unwilling to compromise with even a "a vendor MAY maintain state to allow connectionless resets to work". (coffee != sleep) & (!coffee == sleep) Donald.Smith@xxxxxxxxx gcia > -----Original Message----- > From: tcpm-bounces@xxxxxxxx [mailto:tcpm-bounces@xxxxxxxx] On > Behalf Of The IESG > Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2010 10:25 AM > To: IETF-Announce > Cc: tcpm@xxxxxxxx > Subject: [tcpm] Last Call: draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt (The > TCP Authentication Option) to Proposed Standard > > The IESG has received a request from the TCP Maintenance and Minor > Extensions WG (tcpm) to consider the following document: > > - 'The TCP Authentication Option ' > <draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt-10.txt> as a Proposed Standard > > The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits > final comments on this action. Please send substantive > comments to the > ietf@xxxxxxxx mailing lists by 2010-03-10. Exceptionally, > comments may be sent to iesg@xxxxxxxx instead. In either case, please > retain the beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting. > > The file can be obtained via > http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-o > pt-10.txt > > > IESG discussion can be tracked via > https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/pidtracker.cgi?command=vie > w_id&dTag=16685&rfc_flag=0 > > _______________________________________________ > tcpm mailing list > tcpm@xxxxxxxx > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm > This communication is the property of Qwest and may contain confidential or privileged information. Unauthorized use of this communication is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please immediately notify the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the communication and any attachments. _______________________________________________ tcpm mailing list tcpm@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpm _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf