On Thu, Feb 25, 2010 at 1:07 AM, Masataka Ohta <mohta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > Mark Andrews wrote: > >>>>http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dempsky-dnscurve-00 >>> >>>As I read the draft, it seems to me that DNSCurve without Curve >>>(that is, with 96 bit nonce of DNSCurve as an extended message >>>ID without elliptic curve cryptography) is secure enough. > >> Except from players that can see the query. > > That's not a new cryptographical problem. > > As DNSCurve protection is like DH, it is subject to MitM attacks, > which is no different from simple nonce. Not really. I Don't know what you mean by simple nonce, but as I understand dnscurve if implemented properly would have ssh-style authentication. Only the first request of the server key is vulnerable with mitm. Then it should be cached. regards, Nikos _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf