Pasi,
(Adding the working group mailing list to the discussion; previous
discussion has been at ietf@xxxxxxxxx)
You're right that implementing a "weak shared secret" EAP method (both
the EAP peer and EAP server roles) on both IPsec nodes, combined with
the "EAP mutual authentication" work item (also in the new charter)
could be used in this situation, and would result in roughly the same
functionality (perhaps with slightly more roundtrips/other overhead --
but that's probably not a critical factor here).
OK. And yes, I agree about the significance of roundtrips.
NEW:
However, user-configured shared secrets are still useful for many
other IPsec scenarios, such as authentication between two servers
or routers. These scenarios are usually symmetric: both peers know
the shared secret, no back-end authentication servers are involved,
and either peer can initiate an IKEv2 SA. While it would be
possible to use EAP in such situations (by having both peers
implement both the EAP peer and the EAP server roles of an EAP
method intended for "weak" shared secrets) with the mutual
EAP-based authentication work item (above), a simpler solution may
be desirable in many situations.
This formulation is better than what we had previously. I can live with
this.
But for the record, I am still surprised that I am the only one worried
about this. In my view this additional solution, while perhaps simpler
on its own, will increase code size and complexity for most
implementations. For instance, a device that serves remote access
clients has to implement at least parts of EAP. To support
gateway-gateway weak secrets it now has to add support for another,
completely different authentication mode and associated configuration
mechanisms & policies. Architecturally, it would be better to rely on
few general solutions than to build special case "simpler" solutions
that taken together, actually become more complex. Not to mention the
impact on interoperability.
Jari
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