There are two separate functions in the routing layer. There are security issues in both cases. The first function is to map IP address ranges to AS numbers. This is a global mapping, if an IP address range maps to an AS number in France the same mapping will be good in Brazil. The second function is to establish rooting maps for AS numbers, effectively setting up mappings of the AS numbers to Internet endpoint networks. This mapping is not global. The best route to London is going to be very different in France and Brazil. The upshot is that the first problem maps very cleanly to standard PKI approaches. You can use X.509 certs with extensions, you could use SAML assertions, the statements are global and work very well. The second problem is a much harder one to address using PKI. It is quite possible that PKI is not the right tool at all. The problem is that if A, B and C are exchanging routing information and Mallet introduces a bogus route to A, the message A then sends to B advertising a better route will genuinely have come from A. There are certainly ways round this problem, if indeed it really is a persistent problem. There are non cryptographic controls already in place to verify route quality. It may be that these are sufficient. It may be that we can employ an accountability based approach to pinpoint the introduction of bogus routes. On Sun, Feb 14, 2010 at 7:50 PM, Masataka Ohta <mohta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > SM wrote: > >> The most important factor in choosing a security mechanism is the threat >> model. > > Right. > >> That is, who may be expected to attack what resource, using what >> sorts of mechanisms? (RFC 3631). > > Perhaps, a threat will be by an ISP trying to advertise someone > else's address range as its own. > > However, protections against the threat does not prevent the > ISP advertise the range as someone elses'. > > That is, the ISP can attach its own AS number to a legitimate AS > path for the range. Then, the ISP can capture packets destined > to addresses within the range, against which, there is no > protection. > > Masataka Ohta > > _______________________________________________ > Ietf mailing list > Ietf@xxxxxxxx > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf > -- -- New Website: http://hallambaker.com/ View Quantum of Stupid podcasts, Tuesday and Thursday each week, http://quantumofstupid.com/ _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf