At 16:50 14-02-10, Masataka Ohta wrote:
Perhaps, a threat will be by an ISP trying to advertise someone
else's address range as its own.
Quoting Sandra Murphy [1]:
"Political and business fears don't have to be rooted in technical
truth, unfortunately."
At 19:48 14-02-10, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
I don't think that any member of the IAB would claim that their
expertise in the PKI field precluded debate.
Your message did not make it to the IETF mailing list.
I am not privy to all the details to argue against an IAB
statement. This should not be read as a licence to kill. :-)
This is not a technical issue, it is a political issue. IANA and ICANN
have a really, really bad record when it comes to setting up root
authorities. Any plan that requires their involvement is going to take
considerably more time and effort than one where their involvement is
optional.
Any long-term consequence will be of a political nature. It goes
beyond the IANA function and ICANN. The conventional world is used
to having some form of authority for regulation. The "routing by
rumor" approach does not fit that view. Some considerations may seem
far-fetched. I'll leave it as such.
There are five RIRs, this number is not going to increase in the short
term. Participation of the RIRs is critical for an authoritative
system. Participation of ICANN is not.
It's up to the interested parties to work out the details.
The risk of including ICANN is that misguided or not, there are lots
of people who have concerns as to the power that the US exercises over
the Internet through their defacto control of ICANN. One common
concern is that the US could use such control to ensure that US ISPs
were favored in the distribution of the remaining IPv4 blocks.
I don't think that the distribution of the remaining IPv4 blocks is
that much of an issue.
I would not draw parallels between DNS and IDR as the dynamics are
different. I don't assume that the goal is always about wrecking
havoc. These are classic threats that RPKI can address.
Regards,
-sm
1. http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr/current/msg01099.html
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