AJ Jaghori wrote:
This is a common misconception. DNS over SCTP will not solve 90% of the
problems!
Why?
Attackers are able to guess what DNS queries an SMTP server would put
as a consequence of a client connection. Even after the Kaminsky fix,
that leaves room for brute force attacks. If queries were run over
TCP, the additional requirement to hijack a TCP connection would
reduce the probabilities enough, even for today's botnets. Thus, using
TCP would solve those security issues. (Is that 90%?) It would
introduce some inefficiency, though. (More than DNSSEC?)
SCTP provides for several streams over a single connection, streams
are asynchronous with one another like UDP packets, but are reliably
connected and secured like TCP streams. With decent keep-alive
directives, that would allow a client to be connected with a pool of
relevant resolvers, thereby avoiding the inefficiencies that TCP would
introduce.
On Thu, May 28, 2009 at 10:16 AM, Alessandro Vesely <vesely@xxxxxxx
<mailto:vesely@xxxxxxx>> wrote:
Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
It seems that DNS over SCTP would solve 90% of the problems with 10%
of the efforts and resources required to implement DNSSEC. However,
I hear more often about the latter than the former. How come?
I've read this message via the IETF general mailing list and so I
missed the beginning. In what way can you compare DNSSEC (which
provides object security) and SCTP or TCP (which provide a better
channel security for DNS)?
The discussion was about how to get rid of the threats illustrated,
e.g., in Kaminsky, D.: "It’s the end of the cache as we know it."
In: Black Hat conference (2008). Online at http://www.doxpara.com/DMK_BO2K8.ppt
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