At Sun, 4 Jan 2009 07:51:01 -0500, Marshall Eubanks wrote: > I think that Hank raises a very good question. There has been > a very active discussion of this on NANOG, both re SSL, BGP and in > general. > > Here is the original link : > > <http://hackaday.com/2008/12/30/25c3-hackers-completely-break-ssl-using-200-ps3s/ > > > > Regards > Marshall > > Begin forwarded message: > > > From: Hank Nussbacher <hank@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > > Date: January 4, 2009 2:22:06 AM EST > > To: Mikael Abrahamsson <swmike@xxxxxxxxx>, "nanog@xxxxxxxxx" <nanog@xxxxxxxxx > > > > > Subject: Re: Security team successfully cracks SSL using 200 PS3's > > and MD5 flaw. > > > > At 06:44 PM 03-01-09 +0100, Mikael Abrahamsson wrote: > >> On Sat, 3 Jan 2009, Hank Nussbacher wrote: > >> > >>> You mean like for BGP neighbors? Wanna suggest an alternative? :-) > >> > >> Well, most likely MD5 is better than the alterantive today which is > >> to run no authentication/encryption at all. > >> > >> But we should push whoever is developing these standards to go for > >> SHA-1 or equivalent instead of MD5 in the longer term. > > > > Who is working on this? I don't find anything here: > > http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/idr-charter.html > > > > All I can find is: > > http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2385.txt > > http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3562.txt > > http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4278.txt > > > > Nothing on replacing MD5 for BGP. Oh boy... 1. This isn't a break in SSL per se. It's an attack on a single CA which was still unsafely using MD5. As I understand it, they have now fixed that. So, it's not clear to what extent this has an ongoing impact. In particular, it only affects certificate-based authentication, not authentication with a shared secret, as is used in TCP-MD5. My summary of the attack can be found here: http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2008/12/understanding_the_sotirov_et_a.html 2. The MAC used in TCP-MD5 is weak by modern standards (for several reasons, not just that it uses MD5) and there is already work going on in TCPM to replace it. See draft-ietf-tcpm-tcp-auth-opt. -Ekr _______________________________________________ Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf