I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) reviewer for this draft (for background on Gen-ART, please see http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html). Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you may receive. Document: draft-ietf-smime-sha2-03.txt Reviewer: Spencer Dawkins Review Date: 2008 02 28 IETF LC End Date: 2008-03-07 IESG Telechat date: (if known) Summary: This document isn't ready for publication as a Proposed Standard - it's got enough cut-and-paste errors and apparently-omitted text that I'd think twice about trying to implement it. And if it has a note that says "normative reference still in progress, should be brought in line with normative reference before publishing as an RFC", I'm not sure why it's being last called now (of course, that decision is above my pay grade). Comments: Please include any nits listed in http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf/current/msg50518.html that I may have missed in this review, by reference :-( When one of the last call comments is "There are obvious errors (intentionnaly left by the editor in order to know how many people read the document)", this does not inspire confidence. I note there is no shepherd writeup in the tracker yet. The "of for" typo below has been in every version since 00. Who else has read this draft? Abstract This document describes the conventions for using the message digest algorithms SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, as defined in FIPS Nit - I'm not sure what passes for normal in security drafts, but I'd expect to see SHA and FIPS expanded on first use in the abstract, and in the introduction of the document. Ditto for DSA, RSA, and ECDSA. 180-3, with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). It also describes the conventions for using these algorithms with CMS and the DSA, RSA, and ECDSA signature algorithms. Conventions used in this document Nit - it is odd to see this section as part of the abstract... 1. Introduction This document specifies the algorithm identifiers and specifies parameters for the message digest algorithms SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA- 384, and SHA-512 for use with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC3852]. The message digest algorithms are defined in and [SHS]. Concern: "in and" seems to be missing something. If an implementation chooses to support one of the algorithms discussed in this document, then the implementation MUST do so as described in this document. Concern: this MUST (and the parallel MUST in the next paragraph) seem odd - do you need to say this? Note that [RFC4231] specifies the conventions for use of for the Concern: "of for" seems to be missing something. message authentication code (MAC) algorithms: HMAC with SHA-224, HMAC with SHA-256, HMAC with SHA-384, and HMAC with SHA-512. 2. Message Digest Algorithms The following addresses the parameters field: Nit - this sentence isn't clear and isn't required. I'd strike it. There are two possible encodings for the SHA AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field. The two alternatives arise from the fact that when the 1988 syntax for AlgorithmIdentifier was translated into the 1997 syntax, the OPTIONAL associated with the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters got lost. Later the OPTIONAL was recovered via a defect report, but by then many people thought that algorithm parameters were mandatory. Because of this history some implementations encode parameters as a NULL element and others omit them entirely. The correct encoding is to omit the parameters field; however, implementations MUST also handle a SHA AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field which contains a NULL. Nit - I'd describe the normative behavior, and then provide the history (in a separate paragraph), just so implementers don't have to scan history looking for normative behavior. Concern - the MUST in this paragraph duplicates clearer normative text in the next paragraph. I'd remove the last sentence. The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field is OPTIONAL. If present, the parameters field MUST contain a NULL. Implementations MUST accept SHA2 AlgorithmIdentifiers with absent parameters. Implementations MUST accept SHA2 AlgorithmIdentifiers with NULL parameters. Implementations SHOULD generate SHA2 AlgorithmIdentifiers with absent parameters. 2.4. SHA-512 The SHA-256 message digest algorithm is defined in [SHS]. The Concern - SHA-512, right? algorithm identifier for SHA-512 is: id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } The parameters are as specified in Section 2. 3. Signature Algorithms This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS implementations that support DSA [DSS], ECDSA [X9.62], and RSA [RFC2313] with SHA2 algorithms. Nit - why wait until this late in the document to provide these references? The algorithms have been mentioned a bunch of times without them. Move them to the Introduction? NOTE [to be removed upon publication as an RFC]: NIST has not yet finalized FIPS 186-3 and there is a chance that the draft may be changed. This may result in differences between what is documented in the current version of this document and what is in the FIPS. It is intended to synchronize the final version of this draft with the FIPS before publication as an RFC. Concern: why is this document being Last Called now, if the expectation is that it's going into REF-WAIT and may change before it's published? 3.1. DSA The algorithm identifier for DSA with SHA-224 signature values is: Concern: SHA-256, right? id-dsa-with-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-ccitt(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) algorithms(4) id-dsa-with-sha2(3) 2 } When either of these algorithm identifiers is used, the AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be absent. 3.3. ECDSA 6. References 6.1. Normative References [RFC2313] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Version 1.5", RFC 2313, March 1998. Concern: ID Nits says "** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2313 (Obsoleted by RFC 2437)" _______________________________________________ IETF mailing list IETF@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf