RE: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-sipping-v6-transition-05

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Hello Vijay,

thank you for your answer. 
Your proposed changes resolve my comments. 

Please note that with the revised text for #4 you have introduced a new
spelling error: 
s/mechanisms that protects confidentiality/mechanisms that protect
confidentiality


Best regards, 

Tobias




> -----Original Message-----
> From: Vijay K. Gurbani [mailto:vkg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
> Sent: Monday, July 16, 2007 6:15 PM
> To: Tobias Gondrom
> Cc: secdir@xxxxxxx; iesg@xxxxxxxx; ietf@xxxxxxxx; fluffy@xxxxxxxxx;
> karim@xxxxxxxxxxx; oscar.novo@xxxxxxxxxxxx; mary.barnes@xxxxxxxxxx;
> jon.peterson@xxxxxxxxxxx; gonzalo.camarillo@xxxxxxxxxxxx; vkg@alcatel-
> lucent.com
> Subject: Re: [secdir] SecDir review of
draft-ietf-sipping-v6-transition-05
> 
> Tobias Gondrom wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > Sam Weiler informed me that this draft will be on telechat this
week.
> >
> > I did not receive any answer from the authors to my review of this
> > document as part of the security directorate review process, three
> > weeks ago.
> >
> > Please consider my comments as formal COMMENTS in the IESG
> > evaluation.
> >
> > And at the discretion of the AD: #2 and #4 could/should be seen as a
> >  DISCUSS.
> 
> Tobias: Thanks for your time in reviewing the draft, and
> apologies for not getting back to you earlier.  We did get your
> original review dated June 28th, but with business travel and other
> summer plans, it was a bit of a logistical problem to have the
> authors sync up on addressing your review until recently.  As it
> happens, I was about to send a reply to your review today.
> 
> Your first comment was related to a spelling error; that will
> be fixed.
> 
> Your second comment was as follows:
> > 2. section 4.3: I can not understand why this is a MAY and not at
> > least a SHOULD (or MUST): Once the answerer has generated an answer
> > following the ICE procedures, both user agents MAY perform the
> > connectivity checks specified by ICE.
> >
> > Would recommend to use at least SHOULD instead of MAY in this
> > statement. Maybe good would even be a MUST???
> 
> We've decided to reword that sentence as shown below.  Because
> we are mandating/recommending the use of ICE, we simply say do
> what ICE wants you to do.
> 
> OLD:
>     both user agents MAY perform the connectivity checks
>     specified by ICE.
> 
> NEW:
>     both user agents perform the connectivity checks as
>     specified by ICE.
> 
> The third comments was:
> > 3. section 7 security consideration:
> >
> > This section refers to sec considerations in other documents,
stating
> >  that those cover threats and countermeasures adequately, namely
> > references [6], [7] and [2]
> >
> > [2] is ok, but [6] and [7] are still work in progress, so it must be
> > especially taken care of by the WG chairs that both documents really
> > fulfil this promise. With [7] this looks like near to fulfilment,
but
> >  [6] still is not complete in its Security considerations section
and
> >  must be improved in before LC to also keep up with the promise made
> > in this document.
> 
> [6] is the reference for STUN relay usage; yes, the v6-transition
> draft will have to wait until the STUN relay usage draft has its
> security consideration section flushed out in more detail.
> 
> And the last comment was:
> > 4. section 7:
> >
> > The section correctly informs about the risk that this draft
> >
> > "they may make hosts more amenable to existing threats.  "
> >
> > And it provides an example afterwards. This is good.
> >
> > But I would expect or at least suggest to also provide information
> > about how this risen risk should be countered.
> 
> Fair enough; how about adding text along these lines:
> 
> OLD:
>     Malicious user agents that may intercept the request
>     can mount a denial of service attack targeted to the different
>     network interfaces of the UAC.
> 
> NEW:
>     Malicious user agents that may intercept the request
>     can mount a denial of service attack targeted to the different
>     network interfaces of the UAC.  In such a case, the UAC
>     should use mechanisms that protects confidentiality and
>     integrity, such as TLS [add reference] or S/MIME [add reference].
>     If HTTP Digest is used as an authentication mechanism in
>     SIP, then the UAC should ensure that the quality of protection
>     also includes the SDP payload.
> 
> Please let us know if we were remiss in addressing any other
> concern.  And once again, apologies for the late reply.
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> - vijay
> --
> Vijay K. Gurbani, Bell Laboratories, Alcatel-Lucent
> 2701 Lucent Lane, Rm. 9F-546, Lisle, Illinois 60532 (USA)
> Email: vkg@{alcatel-lucent.com,bell-labs.com,acm.org}
> WWW:   http://www.alcatel-lucent.com/bell-labs

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