On Mar 8, 2007, at 2:13 AM, Brian E Carpenter wrote:
On 2007-03-08 02:06, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
OK I will restate. All connection initiation should be exclusively
mediated through the DNS and only the DNS.
Would that include connections to one's DHCP server, SLP server,
default gateway,
and DNS server?
Hmm...
This is represents a controversial topic where my perspective might
be somewhat unique. But...
In systems that are attempting to be as open as possible, where email
is an example, the primary method for controlling abuse has been to
truncate connections based upon IPv4 addresses. This address space
allows methods using a deterministic amount of solid state
resources. When that address space become complex, where sources
represent a series of addresses translated by gateways, or even using
an IPv6 address, tracking soon exceeds practical resource provisioning.
The quality of the control depends upon rapid turn-around by reacting
from solid state resources. The alternatives are many orders of
magnitude slower. It is not just the route, which is part of the
assessment, but also the specific point of origin being tracked.
There are techniques to consolidate the address space, but this is
not an ideal solution.
Use of IPv4 addressing as a means to control abuse will soon become
problematic. One approach would be to identify the client by name,
and then allow merged messages be cryptographically identified by
name, where this name then authorizes the specific client by name. A
weakness of cryptographic identification is that it can be replayed.
While there might be rate limits in place initially, message replay
thwarts reliance on solely the cryptographic identification.
By relying upon the stewardship of the client responding promptly to
reports of abuse, tracking the names of the clients permits the use
of any IP addressing scheme. The cryptographic identifier would
authorize the client, or the message would be slowed using various
techniques to impose a type of receiver side rate limiting, that
might otherwise be lacking. Rate limiting affords time to respond
and limits the level of damage.
-Doug
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