Michael.Dillon@xxxxxxxxxxxxx trolled:
Read the original discussions of SMTP that led to the development of
DNS. You will find that the proposed use is entirely within the
original scope that Jon Postel anticipated.
And since SMTP has been an utter and complete failure
in operations, I find that to be a dubious point.
Anything used by close to a billion people can't be classed a complete
failure.
...
SMTP, on the other hand is an operational failure and
even today, no one really knows how to properly
implement and properly maintain an SMTP service. The
actions of criminals exploiting weaknesses in the
SMTP architecture have led to a series of bandaids
that still have not proven to be effective.
It's like what Churchill said. It's the worst thing out there, except
for all the others. SMTP won in the market place because people want
the ability to send and receive messages on a non-prearranged basis.
This constraint tied to a complete inability to secure end points has
led to your headaches. Furthermore, the problem is not limited to mail,
but can be seen in IM, and may likely show up in other forms of
communication. Much of this is simply the nature of software.
If the IETF wants to continue defining a stream of
bandaids for SMTP, that is fine as long as they do
not screw up the existing DNS infrastructure. One
simple way to ensure this is to refuse to extend
the DNS protocol as defined for use on port 53,
the domain naming service.
This problem extends beyond the IETF, but the IETF is doing quite a bit
to accommodate the wild west nature of the net. It is not just DKIM.
NEA and focus on identity through BoFs such as DIX and WAE indicate some
effort to better secure communications. It is not a substitute for
securing end points, but improving these functions will help. Paul
Hoffman's work to standardize communication with reputation services
also shows promise.
Eliot
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