David Kessens <david.kessens@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Sat, Oct 21, 2006 at 07:14:41PM -0400, John Leslie wrote: >> >> If we ever do have ADs interested in restoring the rights, I quite >> specifically do _not_ want to repeat the denial-of-service attack on >> this list. > > What denial-of service attack are you talking about ? Caught me there: I was being intentionally vague... ;^( > Without the PR actions, the IESG would have had to discuss every > longer than 30 day suspension every so often. That is not the way I read Brian's draft. (Perhaps we should wordsmith it so _nobody_ can read it that way?) > Every decision would be appealable and would result in using even more > valuable IESG resources each and every time we would make such a > decision as it would have been necessary to decide the merits of each > and every individual suspension over and over again (and for anybody > who has not been present during such discussions, we take this kind of > decisions very seriously and spend a lot of time to make sure that the > chosen approach is/was the proper/wrong one). A RFC 3683 P-R action _needs_ to be taken that seriously. A one-week time-out on a single WG mailing list _shouldn't_ be taken that seriously. In the middle, I'm not sure we have consensus... Brian's draft tries to _design_ a middle where we can have reasonable consensus that the IESG doesn't need to discuss it, least of all reach consensus about where the blame lies. You've been there, David: you _know_ it's hard! >> IMHO, the strong majority of IETF participants are willing to let >> the IESG design a process to deal with these two special cases _if_ >> the occasion even arises! > > Although I am flattered that you have that much confidence in the > IESG, I believe it is not the right thing to do. Oh, I think it is! ;^) > This draft allows the IESG way more leeway than necessary to perform > its job. Perhaps -- but I _really_ don't want to risk allowing them _less_ than they need. > I agree that it is desirable that the IESG can allow longer suspensions > than 30 days that would fall between 30 day suspensions and a full > fledged PR action. That's a good start... > However, the current text in the draft allows the IESG to take > suspension actions without any limits that are way beyond what is > reasonable as there is no limit of the duration of the suspension as > the word 'progessively longer suspensions' is totally undefined and > there is no community oversight required when suspensions get really > lengthy: I freely admit that "progressively longer" can be interpreted to mean "doubling for each similar infraction, without limit". In fact, that is exactly what I would _like_ it to mean. I do not believe the current IESG members would endorse suspensions that severe. The evidence is _quite_ strong that the IESG always will choose a moderate path. (It drives me crazy sometimes!) I'm not sure what David means by "community oversight" here. In the world as I observe it, the IESG is _never_ lacking community input. Does David mean that somebody other than the appeal bodies above them should be expected to overrule them? If so, who? > In addition, the following text is troublesome to me: > > Other methods of mailing list control may be considered but must be > approved by the AD(s) and the IESG. Send text, please. > This basically allows the IESG to do whatever it pleases without > requiring community input. And because of this, it will also be hard > to appeal any decisions made this way as this draft supports the idea > that the IESG has the authority to do so. I don't read it that way. "Community input" can be something other than a formal last-call; but a consensus-based body like the IESG isn't likely to change its rules very much very often. Any "methods" approved by the IESG _must_ be documented, and will most likely be published in IETF Operational Notes. Rest assured, IESG members _will_ hear about it if folks find them unreasonable. >> Ned Freed <ned.freed@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >>> I think what this draft describes is a reasonable thing to have, but >>> IMO it is not a substitute for RFC 3683. >> >> It does not attempt to be a "substitute". It attempts to give needed >> power to WGCs, subject to review by ADs under rules established by the >> IESG. I believe this is what most folks want; and I do not believe that >> most folks want to be subjected to lengthy arguments whether so-and-so >> is a bad person. > > I don't know where you read this: the only power it gives a working > group chair is that (s)he can ask an AD or the IESG for permission to > do a longer than 30 day suspension. Asking questions is not a lot of > power. Asking for something the AD is empowered to approve can be sufficient power. (We need to wait to see what ADs _will_ be empowered to approve.) >>> This is where my problem lies. In the absence of a mechanism with >>> characteristics similar to RFC 3683, I cannot support rescinding it. >> >> And, no surprise, I cannot support keeping a mechanism which generates >> denial-of-service-like situations on this mailing-list and within the >> IESG. > > I don't see what you base this on. Personal opinion -- just like Ned's opinion above it. (It may help you understand if you consider how many years I watched USENET flamewars develop, reaching the conclusion that they must be de-fanged _quickly_...) > Not having this mechanism created way bigger problems than having this > mechanism. This mechanism was created for a reason and it worked. I recognize that David believes this; and I really doubt anything any of us can say will change that belief. I only hope David will accept that there might possibly be a better mechanism. ==== That's enough for one post. I'll address David's question about the difference between WG and non-WG lists in a separate post. (I think we're on the way to a productive exchange here; so I don't mind risking a higher spot an the Narten list. ;^) -- John Leslie <john@xxxxxxx> _______________________________________________ Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf