If such agreement cannot be reached, then I think
DKIM has much more serious problems about applicability and the
definition of the problems being solved than whether or not this
is required.
John,
Unfortunately what you appear to be saying is that you are certain of serious
problems, and are happy to assert them as a barrier to progress -- after all,
you want to insist that a requirement for dealing with your fears be included as
a chartered deliverable -- but you do not feel compelled to provide a solid
basis for these fears.
Before imposing requirements on an IETF effort, one should make a pragmatic case
for it. At base, the case you have so far made is that the reasonable mechanism
of DKIM might get mis-used, just as any other reasonable mechanism might be.
You keep implying that it is somehow a mysterious and big deal to have a
voluntary, validated identity associated with message transit.
It isn't.
And the real fear that we all should have is that it is being characterized as a
bigger deal than it is, including that its supposed "dangers" are vast and unknown.
Let's start with something simple and useful, John:
Are there technical deficiencies in the current DKIM specifications?
If there aren't, then please cite previous IETF work that requires worrying
about unknown, future abuses and imposes those fears as a barrier to chartering.
d/
--
Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
<http://bbiw.net>
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