Re: IETF Last Call: draft-salowey-tls-ticket-06.txt

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



Bernard Aboba <aboba@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:

>> In the extreme case (client gets different server every time, and none 
>> of the servers can understand tickets generated by other servers), it
>> will degrade to normal TLS (full handshake done every time).
>
>>From what I can see, the Ticket structure does not uniquely identify the 
> ticket type or ticket version, so that there is no easy way for the server 
> to determine what type of ticket has been submitted to it, or whether the 
> client is using the recommended format or not.  The server checks the mac 
> in the last 20 octets, and if this is valid, then it decrypts the 
> encrypted_state.  However, if the client were using the same mac, but a 
> different ticket format, the mac could check out, but the StatePlaintext 
> would not match.  A Ticket Type/Version field would make it clear to the 
> server whether it is handling a Ticket of known type. 

I'm not sure I understand this, Bernard. The client doesn't need
to know anything about the ticket format or get to decide
anything about the mac. It's just the server talking to itself. 

-Ekr

_______________________________________________

Ietf@xxxxxxxx
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf

[Index of Archives]     [IETF Annoucements]     [IETF]     [IP Storage]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux SCTP]     [Linux Newbies]     [Fedora Users]