On Thu, Feb 20, 2025 at 3:55 PM Geoff Huston via Datatracker <noreply@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
Reviewer: Geoff Huston
Review result: Ready with Nits
I was assigned as the dnsdir reviewer for draft-ietf-uta-require-tls13-05.
For more information about the DNS Directorate, please see
https://wiki.ietf.org/en/group/dnsdir
NIT: Should the enumeration of the known deficiencies of TLS 1.2 be contained
in the Introduction? The same considerations are described in Section 6, and
their summation in the Introduction seems to be superfluous.
NIT: the assertion in section 3 that "TLS applications will need to migrate to
post-quantum cryptography" is ddependent on the expectation of the lifetime of
the integrity of the encrypted object. The current advice on the immediate need
to use PQC is based on an integrity lifetime of 20 years.I would feel better if
the sentence read "many TLD applications..."
Do you have a source for this 20 year figure? It hasn't figured heavily in the
discussions in (say) TLS WG.
More generally, it's very hard to estimate the meaningful lifetime of data
and even hard to measure the meaningful lifetime when a protocol can
carry multiple kinds of data (e.g., HTTP can carry data with effective
lifetime in seconds like MFA codes or decades like medical information).
Can you provide some examples of protocols which you do not think
need to transition to PQ algorithms?
-Ekr
NIT: Section 4: "As a counter example, the Usage Profile for DNS over TLS
[DNSTLS] specifies TLS 1.2 as the default, while also allowing TLS 1.3." I fail
to appreciate the rationale for including this - the text is careful to note
that this applies to new protocols and DNS over TLS is not a new protocol at
this state.
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