> Version 1.2 of the proposed standard for the Transport Layer Security > protocol was labelled as "Obsolete" [1] since Version 1.3 of the > proposed standard was issued in 2018. I do not understand the point you are trying to make. >There are instructions to IANA for (2). There isn't any instruction >or guidance for the RFC 8447 experts. Should there be some clear >guidance for the RFC 8447 experts as per BCP 26? As one of the TLS experts, and in consultation with the other two, I believe we all understand. IANA will not forward any request for TLS 1.2 codepoints (other than the two exceptions) to the designated experts for review. >There is the following sentence in Section 2: "First IETF discussions >happened around the same time". The reference give for those >discussions points to a set of slides from 2016. I could not find >the minutes for those discussions: The intent is only to show a timetable. If there are no minutes or recording, that doesn't matter. The slides show that a discussion happened and that's the point the draft is making. >There is a logo in the top left corner of the slides which looks like >"IRTF". One alternative would be to drop the word "IETF" as it could >be misleading. Another alternative would be to have a debate about >what the word "IETF" means and whether those 2016 discussions were >held under RFC 2418 guidelines. If this is really a concern then we can say "first discussion in the IETF community" >Section 2 comes out as implications for Version 1.2 of the protocol >instead of implications for post-quantum cryptography. Implications for deployment/implementation of PQ crypto. > The first sentence is Section cites a 2017 web page which was last updated in > November 2024 to argue that there will be a huge impact on RSA in > future. I suggest finding an appropriate source to cite if you wish > to acknowledge that someone reported something about some future event in 2017. I don't know, it's hard to get more current than *just last month* :) > My reading of the message is that the TLS WG was not against long > term support for Version 1.2 of the protocol [2] while it was for of > a feature freeze for Version 1.2 of the protocol. I suggest > considering whether the contradiction could be tackled by providing > unambiguous guidance to the RFC 8447 experts. As EKR said, you misunderstand the context. You would have to look through the discussion about the "TLS 1.2 LTS" draft, where it is more clearly evidenced that the WG wants *no changes* to TLS 1.2 other than how it is configured. Many people in that thread missed that the extension point had already been assigned. Even though I disagree with your points, I do appreciate the very careful read you have to this draft. -- last-call mailing list -- last-call@xxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to last-call-leave@xxxxxxxx
