Brian, > On Oct 16, 2024, at 1:39 PM, Brian Trammell (IETF) <ietf@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On 16 Oct 2024, at 18:54, Erik Auerswald <auerswal@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> On Wed, Oct 16, 2024 at 12:28:46PM -0400, Jeffrey Haas wrote: >> Every described abuse scenario that works with Unaffiliated BFD Echo also >> works without it. The abuse is possible already. It is built into the >> very foundation of the Internet. > > Generalizing Greg Mirsky’s potentially-in-the-rough assessment (I’m not equipped to evaluate it in depth, nor do I have the time right now to devote to becoming so), the question here is a fairly simple one: are there deployment scenarios for this protocol by which a nonparticipant may send UDP packets to a Unaffiliated BFD Echo endpoint in order to cause those packets to be echoed elsewhere by which this protocol becomes a vector for nonamplifying reflection attacks. This is IP forwarding. > > If the assertion is instead that “this echo protocol is okay to define and expose to the Internet because other nonamplifying UDP protocols that can be used for echo spoofing exist”, that is a philosophical discussion that I’m not sure is in scope for this review: it’s my job as a TSV reviewer to make sure that these concerns are aired, and for the IESG to make decisions about the publication of the draft based on those concerns. What I believe this thread is asking us to write is "IP forwarding is a possible attack on the Internet and you need to secure everything that can do forwarding against every possible application that wants to use it". This seems broadly out of scope for the BFD working group. -- Jeff (next 1 April RFC candidate: Home Internet users can send traffic to whomever they want to and they should be stopped!) -- last-call mailing list -- last-call@xxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to last-call-leave@xxxxxxxx
