Hiya, On 10/10/24 03:16, xiao.min2@xxxxxxxxxx wrote:
[XM]>>> No, B is NOT able to any validation, B simply loops Unaffiliated BFD Echo packets back to A. As Erik Auerswald has indicated, this kind of DoS attack can happen without Unaffiliated BFD Echo, i.e., this kind of DoS attack is irrelevant toUnaffiliated BFD Echo.
Well, in that case ISTM the potential DoS is not dealt with properly in this spec. That's I guess a thing the IESG can handle, so we don't need to bottom out on it between us.
So IMHO what we can do is to ask the real-A to include some form of authentication.
I don't really get what you're saying there, sorry, as there is no point in "including some form of authentication" unless a relevant party validates that. Again though, the IESG can figure this out so we don't need to. Cheers, S.
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