Hi,
While I agree with the general point...
On 30.09.2024 15:15, Ben Schwartz
wrote:
Hi Jen!
As noted in paragraph 3 of the Security Considerations, any attacker who can mount these attacks can already take down the whole DHCP system by other means, so these attacks do not reduce the security of the system. As such, I think it would be clearer to note that DHCP is insecure unless special precautions are taken, and the P flag doesn't change that.
I would put it differently: unless someone has deviced a specific attack with the P flag, I would state that the security properties of DHCP are unchanged by the addition of this flag, and leave it at that.
However...
There is a long history of people being confused about the privacy properties of SLAAC and related techniques. For clarity, I think it would be worthwhile to reiterate that DHCPv6 may be inappropriate for privacy-sensitive clients. In general, I think we tend to understate the privacy loss of IPv6 as compared to NAT. I would prefer that we emphasize these problems in our documents, to help us move toward stronger privacy in addressing.
That's probably not for this document. If you want to
write about that, the ISE would surely entertain such a submission
(possibly with authors who have differing points of view).
Eliot
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