Moin, > I think the issue with DANE (for websites) is that it relies on > DNSSEC, which unfortunately, turns into a debate over "who gets to > own the keys to the entire Internet". That actually goes to the core of the issue: You _must_ have one form or another of a trust-root (that is ideally not too large). - The CA store on devices (The CA system) - The DNSSEC root keys - The RPKI (This is an example, not a suggestion to add anything related to webpki in there! Please don't!) > I am certainly interested in brainstorming ways to validate a TLS > certificate *without* the need for DNSSEC. I do not really see options here that go without DNSSEC. The most straight-forward thing i'd see would be doing TLSA, but (one way or another) adding a way to have TLD operators' DNSSEC keys in the trust root as well; Mind: This is hypothetical thought and not a suggestion. This would essentially give us a DNSSEC 'root' ~ 1k times as large, and, ultimately, would be a whole lot of additional unexpected fnorder- y happening when tried. > I think this could actually be done with some non-profit > organizations, IIRC LE is such a non-profit? Or are you thinking more along the lines of what CACert used to (try) to be? > and could provide at least the same level of security as the Domain > Validation checks done by organizations like "Let's Encrypt", but > without needing a Certificate Authority that can sign on behalf of > *any* site, This is, iirc, what CAA is for. Just allowlist the CAs you want to be able to sign for you. If a CA ignores your CAA records--iirc--they will be in _a lot_ of pain. > and without sites needing a signature from a small list of > Certificate Authorities. This is, again, the trust root issue; How much trust root do you distribute? > I could write up more details if people are interested. Not trying to discourage you from doing so, but I'd argue that there are a couple more implications/background things/things tried in the past that would be beneficial to read up upon before 'going in' on that write up. Also note that, in the end, you'd have to have the CA Browser Forum on board. And the browser vendors. And as things stand, that is-- effectively--just google (chromium) and a bit of safari (iirc) and firefox (really, just a bit). > I wanted to make sure this was the right place to discuss it first, > though. Not sure either, though. With best regards, Tobias
