Re: [Last-Call] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-openpgp-crypto-refresh-12

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Hi Linda--

Thanks for your review!

On Wed 2023-11-29 09:48:54 -0800, Linda Dunbar via Datatracker wrote:
> Nits/editorial comments:
> Some of the steps described for "Confidentiality/authentication via Encryption"
> are not clear to me. Hope the authors can answers the following questions:
>
> Section 2.1: Step 3 says that the Sender using Public Key to encrypt the
> Session Key. The  Step 5 says that the Receiver decrypts the Session Key using
> recipient's Private Key. Shouldn't Sender and Recipient use DH with both Public
> Key and Private Key to encrypt and decrypt the Session Key?

When DH is used within OpenPGP for decryption, it involves the
receiver's private key plus an ephemeral share that is packaged
alongside the message itself (in the "public key encrypted session key",
or PKESK packet).

The section you're referring to (§2.1) is a high-level description, and
it doesn't cover all the possible mechanisms available with OpenPGP.
For example, some public key encryption in OpenPGP uses RSA, which
doesn't involve DH at all.  (and as-yet-unspecified quantum-resistant
public key encryption, like ML-KEM, also likely won't use DH, see
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wussler-openpgp-pqc/)

So the contents of the PKESK depends on the specific algorithm used, and
the description in §2.1 describes the overall process without getting
into any particular cryptographic mechanism.

Hopefully this helps understand why that section is written this way.
Please don't hesitate to ask more questions!

          --dkg

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