Re: [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-add-split-horizon-authority-06

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On Fri, 24 Nov 2023 at 20:51, Watson Ladd via Datatracker <noreply@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
Reviewer: Watson Ladd
Review result: Has Issues

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments
were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document
editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call
comments.

The summary of the review is has issues. I found a few editorial things, and
have one question, but I suspect that these can be resolved easily.

Firstly the description of split horizon seems to say that any time the
resolver is authoritative for just some names and recurses for others. I don't
think this is right: the split is that the answers given are different from
what they are for any other resolver, and that's what creates the need for this
draft. This is defined correctly in section 2, it's just a need to reword the
intro slightly.

Sure, we will fix the text as follows:
If this resolver acts as an authoritative server for some names and provides different answers for those domains depending on the source of the query, we say that the network has "split-horizon DNS", because those names resolve in this way only from inside the network.
 

In Section 5 I think more clarity is needed about which DNS name needs to
match, and how the matching is to be done, perhaps citing a UTA doc. I think
what's supposed to be said is that the ADN is a subjectAltName matching under
RFC 6125.

It is discussed in the third paragraph of Section 5. For instance, in the case of DNR, the DNS client would anyway do PKIX validation and validation technique in RFC 6125 (see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9463.html#section-3.3). The DNS client would have to check if the name of the local encrypted resolver matches the ADN in any one of the authorization claims.

-Tiru
 

The one more serious question I have is how does rotation work. The DNS changes
may not take place together with the authorization claim transmission, and this
seems underspecified. Does the split horizon break until the two are in sync
again?

Sincerely,
Watson Ladd


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