Re: [Last-Call] [art] [Ext] Artart last call review of draft-ietf-dprive-unilateral-probing-12

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On Sep 7, 2023, at 6:58 PM, Bron Gondwana <brong@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Sep 8, 2023, at 02:18, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>> Thanks for the review!
>> 
>> On Sep 7, 2023, at 7:16 AM, Bron Gondwana via Datatracker <noreply@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> 
>> > My only concern is that it does fall back very easily to cleartext, for a long
>> > damping period.  As a protocol implementer myself, I would generally expect to
>> > retry something one or two more times over the course of a few minutes before
>> > giving up entirely for 24h, since the server at the other end may have just
>> > been restarting and either dropped an existing connection or rejected a SYN
>> > packet, but be ready a moment later.  I'd be happy with a limit of something
>> > like 5 tries over 2 minutes (one every 30 seconds) before giving up.
>> 
>> In Section 4.3, the "damping" parameter has a "suggested default" of 1 day. That's a suggestion, not at all a requirement. It was established based on the idea that almost every domain name has multiple nameservers, and that it is likely that if one server has a failure such as a timeout, the resolver will try the other nameservers (which may or may not be encrypting).
> 
> Yeah, that bit makes sense, so you'll wind up with one of them having encrypted connection and the other not - so you'll probably want to default to sending further requests to that once since you have it tagged as available for encryption.
> 
>> Are you proposing a shorter value for "damping", or a note saying "1 day is just the suggested value, you might choose a shorter one if you want"? Or something else?
> 
> I'm suggesting a backoff algorithm which isn't "single failure gives you N hours of no retry" - particularly, if you have an existing encrypted connection and it has a fault, my reading was that you don't retry at all to form an encrypted connection, even when talking to somewhere that has previously succeeded.  I agree you don't want to try more than once per day against a server that's never supported encryption, but if you have had consistent success encrypting to a server, then a single failure, you don't want to be treating that one the same!  It's definitely worth retrying faster than a full day later.

This sounds like you want a smaller value than 1 day for `damping` then. Because those parameters are only suggested defaults, a resolver operator like you could simply change the 1 day to maybe 1 hour, with the risk of slowing down resolution to that one nameserver.

--Paul Hoffman

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