Reviewer: Tirumaleswar Reddy
Review result: Ready with issues
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.
The summary of the review is Ready with issues.
[1]
else (or in addition), the Probe Description URI is
"https://[2001:db8::dead]/.well-known/probing.txt". In this case,
there might be a certificate verification issue.
Comment> It is possible to get a certificate with IP address from a public CA
(see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8738).
[2]
You may want to consider referring to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6man-hbh-processing/,
It discusses HBH option processing by intermediate nodes and recommendations to process new HBH options.
[3]
I suggest discussing the privacy implications that an eavesdropper will be able to view the PII data in the Probe.
[4]
As a consequence, the recipient of this information cannot trust it
without confirmation. If a recipient cannot confirm the information
or does not wish to do so, it should treat the flows as if there were
no probe attribution.
Comment> How can the recipient of the probe information validate it is authentic for confirmation ?
Review result: Ready with issues
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.
The summary of the review is Ready with issues.
[1]
else (or in addition), the Probe Description URI is
"https://[2001:db8::dead]/.well-known/probing.txt". In this case,
there might be a certificate verification issue.
Comment> It is possible to get a certificate with IP address from a public CA
(see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8738).
[2]
You may want to consider referring to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-6man-hbh-processing/,
It discusses HBH option processing by intermediate nodes and recommendations to process new HBH options.
[3]
I suggest discussing the privacy implications that an eavesdropper will be able to view the PII data in the Probe.
[4]
As a consequence, the recipient of this information cannot trust it
without confirmation. If a recipient cannot confirm the information
or does not wish to do so, it should treat the flows as if there were
no probe attribution.
Comment> How can the recipient of the probe information validate it is authentic for confirmation ?
Cheers,
-Tiru
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