I will leave it to the authors and shepherd to respond, including
whether to add a reference for the pseudo-code in 2.2.1.
Just to save one piece of effort, the pseudo-code technique used here
was introduced in RFC 8986, and is used in almost all the SRv6 related
drafts / RFCs. While I am not a fan of the particular formalism, it is
what SRv6 uses, and so we all live with it.
Yours,
Joel
On 6/16/2023 4:32 PM, Wesley Eddy via Datatracker wrote:
Reviewer: Wesley Eddy
Review result: Almost Ready
This document has been reviewed as part of the transport area review team's
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(1) Since this defines a behavior where one incoming packet can create N
outgoing packets, I was surprised that there is nothing mentioned in the
security considerations about how access to replication nodes and ingress for
them should be protected in order to prevent abuse.
(2) The intended use seems mainly to be where some outer control system is
responsible for making sure that the replication operation will put packets
onto distinct network paths, and not create congestion either locally or on
some potential shared network segment downstream. It might be more clearly
stated that it's assumed that building a proper multicast tree, managing group
membership, and performing multicast congestion control need to be performed
elsewhere.
(3) I didn't recognize the syntax or pseudocode conventions in section 2.2.1;
maybe this is common or defined somewhere else that could be referenced to be
clear?
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