Reviewer: Linda Dunbar Review result: Ready with Nits I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just like any other last call comments. For more information, please see the FAQ at <https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>. Document: draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-10 Reviewer: Linda Dunbar Review Date: 2023-03-12 IETF LC End Date: 2023-03-13 IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat Summary: This document describes a protocol (EAP-AKA') that can prevent a breach even when an attacker has gained access to the shared secrete in a SIM card. Major issues: None Minor issues: None Nits/editorial comments: It is not clear how the proposed extension is linked with "pervasive surveillance." Is the extension to make pervasive surveillance more difficult? The document stated that the proposed extension makes it not possible to decrypt past communications so as to minimize the impact of SIM breaches. How are those related to "pervasive surveillance"? Page 17 (Section 7): It is hard to parse the following sentence. What does "who are unwilling to mount active attacks against a large number of sessions" mean in the sentence? "This extension can provide assistance in situations where there is a danger of attacks against the key material on SIM cards by adversaries that cannot or who are unwilling to mount active attacks against a large number of sessions." It is difficult to parse the following sentence: "This extension is most useful when used in a context where EAP keys are used without further mixing that can provide Forward Secrecy." Do you mean, "This extension is most useful when used in a context where EAP keys are used without Forward Secrecy"? Thank you, Linda Dunbar -- last-call mailing list last-call@xxxxxxxx https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call
