Re: [Last-Call] Tsvart last call review of draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations-09

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> On 10. Jan 2023, at 01:34, Fernando Gont <fgont@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Hi, Michael!
>
> Thanks a lot for your feedback! In-line....
>
> On 9/1/23 17:55, Michael Tüxen via Datatracker wrote:
>> Reviewer: Michael Tüxen
>> Review result: Ready with Nits
>> This document has been reviewed as part of the transport area review team's
>> ongoing effort to review key IETF documents. These comments were written
>> primarily for the transport area directors, but are copied to the document's
>> authors and WG to allow them to address any issues raised and also to the IETF
>> discussion list for information.
>> When done at the time of IETF Last Call, the authors should consider this
>> review as part of the last-call comments they receive. Please always CC
>> tsv-art@xxxxxxxx if you reply to or forward this review.
>> I have one point which is more than a nit, but not really an issue:
>> For some transport protocols transient numeric identifiers are covered
>> by encryption (like in the QUIC case), sometimes they are not (like in
>> the TCP case), sometimes it depends on the lower layer (like in the
>> SCTP/IP versus SCTP/DTLS/UDP case). The introduction discusses that
>> just encrypting the transient numeric identifiers does not solve all
>> issues.
>> Readers might focus on Section 5 and do not read the whole document.
>> Therefore, it would be good, if Section 5 would also mention, that
>> considerations for transient numeric identifiers have to be made even
>> in the case where the transient numeric identifiers are protected
>> by encryption.
>
> How about adding, at the end of Section 5, a parenthetical note that says:
>
> "NOTE:
>     As discussed in Section 1, use of cryptographic techniques for
>     confidentiality and authentication might not eliminate all the
>     issues associated with predictable transient numeric identifiers.
>     Therefore, the advice from this section should still be applied
>     for cases where cryptographic techniques are employed for
>     confidentiality or authentication of the associated transient
>     numeric identifiers."
> ?
>
> One might also s/should/SHOULD/ or /should still/is to/
>
> Please do let us know what looks best to you.
I would vote for s/should/SHOULD/. That would address my issue.

Best regards
Michael
>
> Thanks!
>
> Cheers,
> --
> Fernando Gont
> SI6 Networks
> e-mail: fgont@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> PGP Fingerprint: F242 FF0E A804 AF81 EB10 2F07 7CA1 321D 663B B494

<<attachment: smime.p7s>>

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