| FWIW, I disagree with the premise of the document as stated in the abstract:
Poor selection of transient numerical identifiers in protocols such
as the TCP/IP suite has historically led to a number of attacks on
implementations
IMO, the expectation that a protocol without any security should be resistant to attacks is incorrect.
This document, and others like it, raise the effort of implementing protocols that are not expected to be secure and only serve to increase implemention complexity and operational overhead when they are properly secured - e.g., in the case of TCP identifiers, as when running inside IPsec tunnels.
We need to cease trying to imply that protocols should be resistant to attacks unless explicitly designed so. Simply picking these identifiers a different way is NOT security and we should stop trying to propagate any myth otherwise.
Joe
— Dr. Joe Touch, temporal epistemologist www.strayalpha.com
On Jan 9, 2023, at 12:55 PM, Michael Tüxen via Datatracker <noreply@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
Reviewer: Michael Tüxen
Review result: Ready with Nits
This document has been reviewed as part of the transport area review team's
ongoing effort to review key IETF documents. These comments were written
primarily for the transport area directors, but are copied to the document's
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I have one point which is more than a nit, but not really an issue:
For some transport protocols transient numeric identifiers are covered
by encryption (like in the QUIC case), sometimes they are not (like in
the TCP case), sometimes it depends on the lower layer (like in the
SCTP/IP versus SCTP/DTLS/UDP case). The introduction discusses that
just encrypting the transient numeric identifiers does not solve all
issues.
Readers might focus on Section 5 and do not read the whole document.
Therefore, it would be good, if Section 5 would also mention, that
considerations for transient numeric identifiers have to be made even
in the case where the transient numeric identifiers are protected
by encryption.
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