> From: Andrew Newton <andy@xxxxxx> > To: Paul Vixie <paul@xxxxxxx> > > If there's a more blatant example of rubber stamping in the history of > > IETF, then I hope a better historian than I can share the archives with > > me. > > If there's a more blatant example of mischaracterization in the history > of IETF.... Whether it is an example of rubber stamping can't be determined until we see the I-D. Besides, the implication that rubber stamping by the IETF is a bad thing is wrong. When the IETF has worked well, it has applied its stamp of approval to things developed, tested, and initially deployed outside the IETF. IETF working groups that try to design things never do better than can be expected of standards committees, and that's a step below the sad results of ordinary committees. The IETF is often competent to determine and publish the choice of the market; it is incompetent at inventing. MARID will provide good service. For years, the unthinking and snake vapor oil vendors insisted that "redesigning" SMPTP with authentication would solve the spam problem. Now that we have SMTP-TLS, SMTP-AUTH, S/MIME, and PGP, they have changed their songs to praise sender authorization. Sender authorization cannot fix the spam problem, but MARID will soak up a lot of their noise for months (or years). When an official sender authorization protocol fails to end spam by the Sept. 2004 (see http://ietf.org/html.charters/marid-charter.html), maybe we'll get to hear a new chorus. Maybe a few will stop praying for the salvation of business models that depend on abusing the commons and switch business models. (e.g. actually deal with abusive users) Vernon Schryver vjs@xxxxxxxxxxxx _______________________________________________ Ietf@xxxxxxxx https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf